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INTRODUCTION 
Federal magistrate judges, often referenced as the “face” of the federal 
courts,1 are key players in the settlement of civil cases2 in the federal courts.3 
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that in the twelve-month 
period from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014, magistrate judges con-
ducted 20,641 settlements sessions (also described as “mediations”).4 During 
the same period in 2012–2013, they conducted 22,757 settlement sessions.5 
                                                        
1  Michael J. Newman, Introduction to PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL 
MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM (2014), http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the-Federal-
Magistrate-Judge-System.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma.cc/N4PY-DT5S]. 
2  The focus of this Article will be on magistrate judges’ involvement in the settlement of 
civil cases, but it is important to note that magistrate judges also can be involved in settle-
ment in the criminal context—i.e., plea bargaining. Indeed, there have been calls for judges 
to play a more active role in this ubiquitous process. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sara Sun 
Beale & Nancy King to Rule 11 Subcommittee (Aug. 27, 2014), in ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 135, 147–49 (Nov. 4–5, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-
criminal-procedure-november-2014 [https://perma.cc/T5RE-96K8] (citations omitted) (de-
scribing a proposal to amend Rule 11 to allow judges to conduct judicially-supervised crimi-
nal settlement conferences, noting that a 1979 survey of 3,000 judges found that 31 percent 
attended plea negotiations, and reporting the role played by judges in such negotiations in 
Florida, Connecticut, and Arizona). 
3  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 47. 
4  See Table S-17—Matters Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges During the 12-Month Pe-
riods Ending September 30, 2005 and 2010 Through 2014, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/s-17/judicial-business/2014/09/30 
[https://perma.cc/N9DZ-DAVF] [hereinafter Table S-17]. Increasingly, judges and commen-
tators perceive an overlap between judicial settlement sessions and mediation. See, e.g., Wil-
liam Caprathe, The Successful Road to Settlement, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/con 
tent/dam/aba/uncategorized/dispute_resolution/just-resolutions/caprathe_successful_road_t 
o_settlement.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/6QNP-ZLXS] (describing discussion at 
January 12, 2015 A.B.A. roundtable entitled The Successful Road to Settlement: The Inter-
section of Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conference). 
5  See Table S-17, supra note 4 (also showing the following number of settlement confer-
ences/mediations conducted by magistrate judges: 24,729 (2005), 20,592 (2010), 20,332 
(2011), 21,095 (2012), 22,757 (2013)). Somewhat surprisingly, there was a 9 percent decline 
in the number of magistrate judge-conducted settlement sessions or judicial mediations in 
2014 compared to 2013. See Felix Recio et al., Who Is the Magistrate Judge? Litigating Be-
fore U.S. Magistrate Judges in District Courts, 41 ADVOCATE 40, 42 (Winter, 2007) (noting 
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Meanwhile, the federal district courts disposed of 258,278 cases in 2013–2014, 
and 255,071 in 2012–2013.6 The Administrative Office does not specifically 
identify the number of dispositions resulting from magistrate judges’ settlement 
sessions.7 It does report, however, that from October 1, 2013 to September 30, 
2014, the disposition of 27,064 cases occurred “during or after pretrial”—i.e., 
primarily during or after a Rule 16 pretrial conference.8 That number was 
                                                                                                                                 
decline in magistrate judge-facilitated settlement conferences between 2003 and 2006 and 
suggesting that mediation outside the courts is the primary cause for the decline). 
6  See Table C-4A—U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Terminated, by District and Action Tak-
en—During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2014, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-4a/judicial-business/2014/09/30 [https://perma.cc/ 
KJ57-VY6Y] [hereinafter Table C-4A September 30, 2014] (showing that of the 258,278 
cases terminated during this period, termination occurred before pretrial in 176,363 cases 
and occurred during or after pretrial in 27,064 cases); Table C-4—U.S. District Courts—
Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suite and Action Taken During the 12-Month Period 
Ending September 30, 2013, U.S. CTS. (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.us 
courts.gov/statistics/table/c-4a/judicial-business/2013/09/30 [https://perma.cc/GU4X-FRA5] 
[hereinafter Table C-4 September 30, 2013] (showing that of the 255,071 cases terminated 
during this period, termination occurred before pretrial in 171,973 cases and occurred during 
or after pretrial in 25,816 cases); see also Table C—U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Com-
menced, Terminated, and Pending During the 12-Month Periods Ending December 31, 2013 
and 2014, U.S. CTS. (Dec. 31, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c/statistical-
tables-federal-judiciary/2014/12/31 [https://perma.cc/992M-Z77G] (showing that in 2014, 
the federal district courts terminated a total of 260,629 civil cases while in 2013, the federal 
district courts terminated a total of 259,489 civil cases). The Administrative Office also pro-
vides potentially very important details regarding the composition of these dispositions. For 
example, the Office reported that in 2014, the greatest growth in the termination of civil cas-
es occurred “in the Southern District of Illinois (IL-S), which terminated 4,892 cases, 3,330 
of them personal injury/product liability multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases alleging injuries 
arising from birth control pills. The District of Arizona terminated 6,871 cases; more than 
2,600 of these cases involved prison conditions, and most were filed by a single state 
prisoner.” U.S. District Courts—Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscour 
ts.gov/statistics-reports/us-district-courts-judicial-business-2014 [https://perma.cc/GS9P-UY 
Y8] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016). 
7  See Table C-4A September 30, 2014, supra note 6 (no specific category for dispositions as 
a result of settlement sessions); Table C-4 September 30, 2013, supra note 6 (no specific cat-
egory for dispositions as a result of settlement sessions). 
8  See Table C-4A September 30, 2014, supra note 6 (showing that of the 258,278 cases ter-
minated during this period, termination occurred before pretrial in 176,363 cases and oc-
curred during or after pretrial in 27,064 cases). “During or after pretrial” means disposition 
occurred after an answer was filed and a Rule 16 pretrial conference was held before a judge 
or magistrate judge or if a request for trial de novo was made after arbitration; “before pretri-
al” means that disposition occurred before an answer was filed and before a motion was 
made by the plaintiff and before a hearing, or in the defendant’s absence and after a hearing 
was held but not on plaintiff’s motion, or upon plaintiff’s motion to terminate (including 
prisoner petitions), or after an answer or Rule 12 motion with some judicial action but not a 
pretrial conference, or when no other category applies. See CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTING 
GUIDE VERSION 1.1 at 33–35 (2010); E-mail from Johnny Wiseman, to Nancy Welsh (Dec. 
23, 2015, 19:37) (on file with the author). 
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25,816 for the same period in 2012–2013.9 If every session conducted by a 
magistrate judge resulted in settlement, this would mean that approximately 8–
9 percent of the federal courts’ dispositions—as well as the overwhelming ma-
jority of the dispositions occurring during or after Rule 16 pretrial confer-
ences—result directly from magistrate judges’ settlement sessions.10 
Importantly, magistrate judges generally do not work alone in facilitating 
settlement. They work in concert with other judicial officers or adjuncts. Most 
frequently, they coordinate their efforts with district judges or other “buddy” 
magistrate judges.11 In these cases, the responsible district judge (or a “buddy” 
magistrate judge in some courts) will conduct a trial if the magistrate judge’s 
settlement session does not result in disposition.12 Obviously, in many cases, 
the prospect of adjudication increases the likelihood of settlement. Magistrate 
judges also partner with another group of actors to achieve settlement in the 
federal courts: staff mediators and the private mediators who are on courts’ ros-
ters. Magistrate judges may refer entire categories of cases, individual cases, or 
particular issues to these mediators.13 The mediators are then responsible for 
facilitating settlement, with the understanding that if a trial is needed, it will be 
conducted by the magistrate judge (provided that the parties have consented to 
the magistrate judge’s jurisdictional authority to conduct a trial).14 Although it 
appears that mediation is used more frequently than any other alternative dis-
pute resolution (“ADR”) process in the federal courts, it is unclear exactly how 
many cases go to mediation or other dispute resolution procedures, because the 
Administrative Office does not make system-wide data available regarding 
such referrals.15 However, in 2011, a subset of the federal courts reported 
17,833 referrals to mediation and 4,222 referrals to a multi-option program that 
                                                        
9  See Table C-4 September 30, 2013, supra note 6 (of the 255,071 cases terminated during 
this period, termination occurred before pretrial in 171,973 cases and occurred during or af-
ter pretrial in 25,816 cases). 
10  This is, of course, entirely hypothetical. As noted supra, there is no available data regard-
ing the number of dispositions resulting from magistrate judges’ settlement sessions. Even if 
there was such data, we would also want to know about how cause and effect were deter-
mined. For example, we would want to know whether dispositions occurred during the set-
tlement session itself or in the weeks or months following the session. If the disposition oc-
curred in the weeks or months following the session, we would want to know how the 
Administrative Office, or the individual district court staff responsible for inputting the data, 
determined whether or how the settlement session contributed to the disposition. 
11  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 43–45; Wayne D. Brazil, Judicial Mediation of Cases As-
signed to the Judge for Trial: Magistrate Judges Celeste F. Bremer and Karen K. Klein, 17 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 24, 25 (Spring 2011). 
12  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 44–45. 
13  See infra Part I.D. 
14  See infra Part I.B–C. 
15  See DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT, FED. 
JUD. CTR. 14 (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$fi 
le/adr2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZQN-YKNZ]. 
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included mediation.16 They reported that another 1,571 referrals were primarily 
to judicially hosted settlement conferences.17 In total, these referrals represent-
ed about 15 percent of the civil dockets of the reporting districts.18 
On occasion, magistrate judges do work alone to offer both settlement as-
sistance and adjudication in a case.19 In these matters—and again, only if the 
parties have consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdictional authority to con-
duct a trial—the magistrate judge manages the pretrial process, facilitates the 
settlement session, and if settlement is not achieved, presides over a bench or 
jury trial.20  
To many, settlement is simply an expedient necessity that permits the 
courts to function,21 and the involvement of magistrate judges may be under-
stood as similarly expedient. The procedures and partnerships described above 
therefore may seem minor, and not worthy of examination. From the perspec-
tive of the parties involved in these processes, however—and the concepts of 
procedural justice, due process, and self-determination—the procedures and in-
teractions among magistrate judges, district judges, and mediators matter tre-
mendously.  
We know that parties are more likely to perceive procedural justice, for ex-
ample, if dispute resolution processes provide them with these elements: the 
opportunity to express what is most important to them, a demonstration by the 
third party or decision-maker that she is providing trustworthy consideration of 
what the parties said, and a neutral and dignified forum that treats the parties 
                                                        
16  See id. at 15. 
17  These federal districts reported referrals in order to seek supplemental funding to support 
their mediation programs. See id. at 14–15 (also observing that these numbers probably do 
not include all cases sent by all districts to mediation). 
18  Id. at 15. 
19  See Ascom Hasler Mailing Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2010 WL 4116858 at *4 
(D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2010) (observing that magistrate judges in the U.S. District Court of the 
District of Columbia “are often called upon to try a case after they have presided over set-
tlement discussions”); Brazil, supra note 11, at 24–25 (noting that in the U.S. District Court 
of North Dakota, Judge Klein has served as the judicial mediator in cases assigned to her for 
trial and views it as “perfectly acceptable for the trial judge to serve as the settlement judge 
if the practice is limited: (1) to situations in which the parties voluntarily consent to the trial 
judge’s involvement in settlement; and (2) to jury cases that are fact-driven, rather than driv-
en by issues of law” and notes that hers is a “small court” and thus does “not have the luxury 
of multiple magistrate judges in the same location”); Jacob P. Hart, Getting to “Settled.” Ten 
Suggestions for a Successful Mediation, 1 SEDONA CONF. J. 71, 76 (2000) (referencing set-
tlement in his own cases); Nancy A. Welsh & Bobbi McAdoo, Eyes on the Prize: The Strug-
gle for Professionalism, 11 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 13, 14 (Spring 2005) (disclosing judge’s re-
sponse to confidentiality concerns raised when judge is both mediator and adjudicator); see 
also James J. Alfini, Risk of Coercion Too Great: Judges Should Not Mediate Cases As-
signed to Them for Trial, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 11, 11 (Fall 1999) (supporting judges serving 
as mediators unless judge is presiding over parties’ trial); Frank E.A. Sander, A Friendly 
Amendment, 6 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 11, 11, 24 (Fall 1999) (concurring with Prof. Alfini). 
20  See Brazil, supra note 11. 
21  See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073 (1984). 
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and their claims even-handedly.22 Now consider the following variations in 
magistrate judges’ involvement in the settlement procedures described above 
and their potential effect on parties’ perceptions of procedural fairness:23 
•  Magistrate Judge-Mediator Pairing. A mediator facilitates the parties’ set-
tlement discussions in a case. The magistrate judge will conduct a trial 
only if the parties are unable to reach settlement in mediation. The 
court’s local rules describe mediation communications as “confiden-
tial” but also require the parties’ “good faith participation” in the pro-
cess. The parties and their lawyers know that as a result of the court’s 
“good faith participation” requirement, mediators have occasionally 
disclosed to judges what occurred during mediation, including what 
occurred in caucus.24 Thus, the parties and their lawyers may worry 
that what they say or do in mediation, including in caucus, will be dis-
closed to the magistrate judge. The mediator begins with a joint session 
but conducts most of the mediation in caucus—or ex parte meetings—
and learns information from each party that she does not disclose to the 
other party. 
Are the parties more or less likely to perceive the settlement phase with the 
mediator as providing them with procedural justice? Are they more or less like-
ly to perceive a subsequent adjudicative phase with the magistrate judge as 
providing them with procedural justice? 
                                                        
22  See infra Part III. 
23  This Article will not address procedural due process or self-determination, which also 
could apply here. More specifically, procedural due process certainly would apply to adjudi-
cative processes, but it would not apply to voluntary settlements unless the state effectively 
coerced settlements that effected a deprivation of life, liberty or property. See Nancy A. 
Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise 
Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179, 188 (2002). Procedural due process 
also might apply if something about the settlement procedure impermissibly heightened the 
risk of error in the adjudicative procedure. An example of such effect might be the disclosure 
of a mediation communication to the presiding judge. Regarding self-determination, it is un-
likely that this concept will apply to most court procedures. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thin-
ning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of 
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 6, 49 (2001) [hereinafter Thinning Vision]. 
One of the fundamental principles underlying mediation, however, is self-determination. 
Therefore, the concept might apply to a procedure described as “judicial mediation” and to 
parties’ procedural and substantive decision-making. See James J. Alfini, Mediation As a 
Calling: Addressing the Disconnect Between Mediation Ethics and the Practices of Lawyer 
Mediators, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 829, 831 (2008) (describing self-determination as “the one 
value that distinguishes mediation from other dispute resolution processes”); Peter Robinson, 
Adding Judicial Mediation to the Debate About Judges Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned 
to Them for Trial, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 335, 371–72 (2006) (describing Travelers Cas. & 
Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 751 (2005) and Advisory Committee Comment 
to California Rule 1620.1(d) and application of self-determination to judicial mediation). 
24  See Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 363, 410–17 (2011) (describing cases involving claims of violation of obliga-
tion to participate in mediation in good faith). 
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•  Magistrate Judge-District Judge Pairing. The magistrate judge facilitates 
the settlement session, and a district judge conducts a trial if needed. 
Like the mediator in the prior example, the magistrate judge meets ex 
parte with the parties and learns information from each party that the 
magistrate judge does not disclose to the other party. The parties and 
their lawyers know that the magistrate judge is not bound to keep what 
he learns confidential. Thus, he may make disclosures to the district 
judge about what occurred or was said during the settlement session, 
including in caucus. Again, this worries the parties and their lawyers.  
Are the parties more or less likely to perceive the settlement phase with the 
magistrate judge as providing them with procedural justice? Are they more or 
less likely to perceive the adjudicative phase with the district judge as provid-
ing them with procedural justice? 
•  Magistrate Judge Alone—and with Consent Sought Only Before Settle-
ment Session. The magistrate judge serves as both the facilitator of the 
settlement session and the trial judge (in the event that settlement can-
not be achieved). The district’s clerk of court seeks the parties’ consent 
to the magistrate judge’s adjudication of the case only before the 
commencement of the settlement phase, not after the completion of the 
settlement phase. The magistrate judge meets ex parte with the parties 
during the settlement phase and learns information from each party that 
the magistrate judges does not disclose to the other party. The case 
does not settle. Therefore the parties must go to trial before the magis-
trate judge. The parties and their lawyers worry about the effects of 
what was said or done during the settlement session, including what 
the other side said or did in caucus.  
Are the parties more or less likely to perceive the settlement phase with the 
magistrate judge as providing them with procedural justice? Are they more or 
less likely to perceive the adjudicative phase with the magistrate judge as 
providing them with procedural justice? 
As will be discussed in greater detail, each of these scenarios raises con-
cerns that the disclosure to a presiding judge of “confidential” settlement com-
munications or behavior is likely to undermine parties’ perceptions of the pro-
cedural fairness of the adjudicative phase. Meanwhile, the failure to disclose to 
the parties the “confidential” communications or behavior occurring during ex 
parte sessions is likely to undermine the parties’ perception of the procedural 
fairness of both the settlement and adjudicative phases. The scenarios also may 
raise concerns regarding due process and coercion. Structural reforms inspired 
by our knowledge of procedural justice research have, at the very least, the po-
tential to reduce the likelihood of claims of coercion or violation of due pro-
cess.25 Due to the effects of procedural justice, these reforms also have the po-
                                                        
25  See infra Part V.C. 
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tential to increase parties’ trust in, and perceptions of the legitimacy of, magis-
trate judges and their courts.26  
In addition, researchers and administrators are beginning to experiment 
with different tools to permit judges and other neutrals to solicit feedback from 
parties and attorneys regarding their perceptions of procedural fairness, engage 
in video review and self-reflection that focuses on procedural fairness, and par-
ticipate in peer-to-peer dialogue on this issue and others.27 This Article will dis-
cuss those tools, including a questionnaire that has been developed by the au-
thor and two colleagues. The questionnaire is designed to permit judges to 
receive feedback regarding whether they engaged in particular behaviors, 
whether those behaviors were perceived as helpful, whether the behaviors en-
hanced or detracted from perceptions of procedural justice, and whether such 
perceptions also were influenced by the context within which the behaviors oc-
curred. 
Ultimately, this Article will urge the following structural reforms to en-
hance the procedural justice provided by magistrate judges and settlement pro-
cedures in the federal courts: 
•  When different neutrals conduct the functions of settlement and adjudica-
tion (e.g., mediator and then magistrate judge, or magistrate judge and 
then district judge), and ex parte meetings are used during the settle-
ment phase, the federal courts should provide for strict confidentiality 
regarding settlement communications and conduct that occurred during 
the ex parte meetings, with limited and explicit exceptions. 
•  When a single magistrate judge conducts the functions of both settlement 
and adjudication, the magistrate judge should be barred from using 
caucus or ex parte meetings during the settlement session, and the par-
ties should be given the opportunity after the settlement session to 
elect whether or not the magistrate judge will conduct the trial using 
the confidential, “blind consent” procedures provided by 28 USC 
§ 636(c)28 and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.29 
•  The Judicial Conference of the United States30 should provide its magis-
trate judges31 with the opportunity to receive feedback or engage in 
self-reflection or dialogue regarding parties’ and attorneys’ perceptions 
of the procedural justice of their settlement sessions. A sample tool ap-
pears as an appendix to this Article. 
                                                        
26  See infra Part III. 
27  See infra Part V.A. 
28  28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012). 
29  FED. R. CIV. P. 73. 
30  “The Judicial Conference of the United States is the national policy-making body for the 
federal courts.” Governance & the Judicial Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov 
/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference [https://perma.cc/U3C2-5TS4] (last 
visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
31  It would be ideal if the same opportunity and mechanisms were extended to district judg-
es, staff mediators, and roster mediators as well. 
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In addition, due to the significant role played by settlement in the disposi-
tion of federal matters, the Judicial Conference should require the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts to report data regarding the number of disposi-
tions that are the result of settlement generally, and more specifically, the 
number of such dispositions that are the result of: unassisted settlement by the 
parties, settlement sessions conducted by magistrate judges, settlement sessions 
conducted by district judges, mediations conducted by courts’ staff or roster 
mediators, and mediations conducted by private mediators. 
This Article begins, in Part I, with an overview of magistrate judges’ histo-
ry and role generally, including a discussion of the mechanism of “blind con-
sent” that must be undertaken before a magistrate judge may conduct a trial. 
Part I then turns to magistrate judges’ role in settlement and ADR, outlines the 
procedural and ethical rules governing judges’ role in settlement, and highlights 
research revealing lawyers’ concerns regarding judges’ role in settlement. In 
Part II, the Article provides a brief overview of mediation in the federal courts 
and considers the relationship between judge-hosted settlement sessions and 
mediation. With this background regarding the magistrate judges’ particular 
role in settlement and the procedural, ethical and dispute resolution-related con-
texts within which judicial settlement fits, the Article turns in Part III to an 
overview of the procedural justice literature and then, in Part IV, returns to the 
three scenarios described supra to consider whether parties are likely to per-
ceive both the adjudicative and settlement phases as procedurally fair. This 
analysis reveals the need for structural changes, including enhanced clarity re-
garding the scope and limits of confidentiality, strict limits on magistrate judg-
es’ use of ex parte meetings, the need to insert a second opportunity for blind 
consent after a magistrate judge conducts a settlement session, and the need to 
provide magistrate judges with the opportunity to receive feedback and engage 
in self-reflection regarding the procedural fairness of their settlement efforts. In 
Part V, the Article reviews mechanisms currently used to provide judges with 
opportunities for feedback and self-reflection, and introduces a new tool that 
focuses particularly on the procedural justice of settlement sessions.  
I.   MAGISTRATE JUDGES AND SETTLEMENT 
A.    Magistrate Judges’ History and Role Generally 
In order to understand the functions of today’s magistrate judges, it is help-
ful to examine a bit of their history.32 Congress passed the Federal Magistrates 
                                                        
32  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 7–17 (describing the evolution from early “commissioners” 
to “federal magistrates” to “federal magistrate judges,” with changes in this position’s re-
quired credentials, length of employment, compensation, functions, etc.); see also Tim A. 
Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 
661, 664 (2005) (citing Leslie G. Foschio, A History of the Development of the Office of 
United States Commissioner and Magistrate Judge Systems, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4, I.1 
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Act of 1968 to address several problems that had arisen with the system of 
“commissioners” that then existed: the impropriety of a fee-based compensa-
tion system for federal judicial officers; the failure to require commissioners to 
be lawyers; the part-time nature of most commissioners’ work; and the lack of 
sufficient legal or organizational support for the commissioners.33 The Act sig-
nificantly improved the role of magistrates—providing for expanded functions, 
multi-year contracts and salaries, and a change in title from “commissioner” to 
“magistrate.”34 As will be described infra, permissive language in the Act also 
led some federal district courts to capitalize upon their magistrates’ reputations 
and expertise and make them responsible for facilitating settlements.35 
Additional legislative enhancements followed. In 1976, Congress author-
ized magistrates to decide non-dispositive pretrial and discovery matters, with 
some exceptions, and clarified the standard of judicial review to be used by dis-
trict court judges.36 Just three years later, in 1979, Congress passed legislation 
permitting magistrates to conduct trials and order final judgment in civil mat-
ters, although only with the consent of the parties and with the opportunity for 
appeal.37 Subsequent legislation improved federal magistrates’ salaries, provid-
                                                                                                                                 
(1999)); R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Justice 
Reform, 67 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 799 (1993). 
33  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 10 (citing U.S. Commissioner System: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
Part 1 (1965)). 
34  See id. at 10–12. It is interesting to note the flurry of important procedural developments 
that occurred during this time, particularly those focusing on the importance and need to pro-
tect the impartiality of adjudicators. As described above, Congress passed the Federal Magis-
trates Act in 1968 and ended the fee-based system of compensation for magistrates. The Su-
preme Court’s 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) specifically 
described an impartial decision-maker as a key element of procedural due process. In 1972, 
the Supreme Court decided Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 1241 (1972), finding a 
violation of procedural due process when an Ohio mayor responsible for his village’s financ-
es also served as a judge and assessed criminal fines that represented a substantial portion of 
his village’s budget; it did not matter that the mayor did not receive personal income from 
the fines he assessed. See Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)Partial Enough” in a World of 
Embedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 395, 442–46 (2010) (describing series of cases in-
volving Ohio mayors serving as judges). The Supreme Court has recently returned to the 
need to establish procedural safeguards to protect judges’ impartiality.  See e.g., Williams v. 
Pennsylvania, No. 15-5040, slip op. (St. Ct. June 9, 2016) (constitutionally impermissible 
risk of bias exists when appellate judge had earlier, personal involvement as district attorney 
in critical decision regarding defendant’s case). 
35  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 19. 
36  See id. at 15–16 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (2012)); see also United States v. Rad-
datz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Kevin Koller, Deciphering De Novo Determinations: Must Dis-
trict Courts Review Objections Not Raised Before a Magistrate Judge?, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1557 (2011); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., District Court Review of Findings of Fact Proposed by 
Magistrates: Reality Versus Fiction, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1236 (2013). 
37  See MCCABE, supra note 1, 16–17 (codified at 28 § U.S.C. 636(c)); see also Federal 
Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, §§ 201, 202, 207, 110 Stat. 3847 
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ed for a retirement system and merit selection process, and enhanced the pres-
tige of the office with the title of “United States magistrate judge.”38  
Today, the number of magistrate judges nearly equals the number of Arti-
cle III district judges. In 2014, the Judicial Conference authorized 534 full-time 
magistrate judgeships, thirty-six part-time judgeships, and three combination 
clerk/magistrate judge positions,39 while Congress authorized 677 district court 
judgeships.40 Some suggest that the expansion of magistrate judges is the result 
of the magistrate judges’ ability to perform most of the functions of Article III 
judges, while also providing greater flexibility and ease in terms of both ap-
                                                                                                                                 
(1996) (removing right to appeal final judgment in civil consent cases to district court). See 
generally Dessem, supra note 32. 
38  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 12–14; Dessem, supra note 32, at 805–10 (observing that 
the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, enacted as Title III of the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, permitted judges to remind the parties of their right to 
consent to magistrate judges’ jurisdiction and changed their title from “magistrate” to “Unit-
ed States magistrate judge” and also describing the recommendations of the 1989 report of 
the Brookings Institution Task Force on Civil Justice Reform and the 1990 report of the Fed-
eral Courts Study Committee). 
This Article is not detailing the history of magistrate judges’ institutionalization in the 
federal courts. Commentators have expressed concerns over the years, however, about the 
federal courts’ increasing reliance on magistrate judges; others have praised the development 
and the enhanced flexibility that it provides to the courts in responding to changes in their 
dockets. See id. at 838 n.180 (citing to Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A 
Comment on Magistrates and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2215–16 (1989); then citing 
Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581 (1985); 
then citing Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Pro-
cedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2132–33 (1989); then citing Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan 
B. Wiener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts: Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 429, 437 (1988); and then citing 
REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP APPOINTED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 
1990, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF P.A., reprinted in 138 F.R.D. 167, 278 (1991)); 
see also Baker supra note 32, at 666–67 (analogizing federal courts’ embrace of magistrate 
judges to states’ embrace of legalized gambling; though there is visceral resistance, “the 
heavy demands of the federal court docket have forced Congress and the district courts to 
search for new ways to manage the workload, and magistrate judges provide a potent and 
available source for this task”). 
Similar concerns have been raised about arbitrators and mediators essentially becoming 
“judicial adjuncts”—and with even fewer protections and less oversight than are provided 
for magistrate judges. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitra-
tion, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 205 
(2012); Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 5–6 (2011) [hereinafter Musings on Mediation]; Nancy A. Welsh, The 
Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 132 (2004). 
39  See Appointments of Magistrate Judges – Judicial Business 2014, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/appointments-magistrate-judges-judicial-business-
2014 [https://perma.cc/K9DR-PT7Z] (last visited Apr. 21, 2016). 
40  See U.S. DISTRICT COURTS ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, U.S. CTS., 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/393/download [https://perma.cc/DRC4-XBMD] (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2016). 
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pointment and removal.41 Indeed, because district judges’ available time is lim-
ited by their obligation to meet the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act in 
criminal cases,42 some urge that magistrate judges have become the “face of the 
federal courts” in many districts, particularly for civil matters.43  
The districts vary considerably, though, in their use of magistrate judges.44 
While in some districts, the district judges are personally involved in the early 
and active management of their cases,45 other districts regularly delegate initial 
pretrial conferences, case scheduling, motions, discovery disputes (especially 
those involving e-discovery), settlement, and even the final pretrial conference 
to their magistrate judges.46 Magistrate judges also may hold hearings on dis-
positive motions in civil matters and propose findings of fact and recommenda-
tions, with final disposition reserved to the district judges.47 In many districts, 
the Clerk’s Office randomly assigns a district judge and magistrate judge to 
                                                        
41  Baker, supra note 32, at 670 (“Although the process for selecting magistrate judges is 
highly competitive and can be grueling in its own right, the lack of a requisite presidential 
and congressional blessing makes the ordeal less onerous than for the district judges.”); see 
also Felix Recio et al., supra note 5, at 44–46 (describing the advantages of using a magis-
trate judge based on the steps in the appointment process, required qualifications for the po-
sition, confidentiality of the application process, and the interest of district judges in ensur-
ing the competence of magistrate judges). 
42  See Dessem, supra note 32, at 823–24 (generally describing the roles played by magis-
trate judges); James R. Knepp II, A Magistrate Judge Reflects on Settlement, FED. LAW., 
May/June 2014, at 104 (explaining that district judges may have less time to prepare for set-
tlement sessions than magistrate judges, due to the “calendar urgency” of felony trials and 
the burden of felony sentencing). 
43  One commentator has noted that a magistrate judge often is “the first federal judge a party 
sees when first coming to federal court.” Michelle H. Burns, U.S. Magistrate Judges: The 
Breadth and Depth of Their Service, FED. LAW., May/June 2014, at 65 (quoting Dist. Judge 
and Fed. Bar Ass’n President, Gustavo Gelpi); see also Baker, supra note 32, at 661. But see 
Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 KAN. L. REV. 849, 849–
54 (2013) (summarizing concerns that have been raised regarding the lack of live interaction 
between federal trial judges and litigants and lawyers, and calling for trial judges to under-
take several initiatives to renew such contact including holding early and live Rule 16 con-
ferences so that the lawyers—and to some degree, the parties—see the face and hear the 
voice of the court). 
44  See Dessem, supra note 32, at 799, 804–05 (describing the varying roles of magistrate 
judges based on the Civil Justice Reform Act advisory group reports and the expense and 
delay reduction plans adopted in thirty-four early implementation district courts—and using 
previously-established categories of team player, specialist, and additional judge). 
45  See Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 43, at 852–54 (urging generally that federal trial 
judges should hold an early Rule 16 conference, rather than waiting for the lawyers to hold a 
Rule 26(f) conference, and should engage in active case management and also urging that 
the lawyers need to cooperate with the judge’s efforts to expedite the case). 
46  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 43. 
47  28 USC § 636(b) (2012); see also Elizabeth French, Respecting the Linchpin: Why Absen-
tee Consent Should Limit Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 32, 38–
39 (2015). 
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each case.48 In those districts, magistrate judges’ responsibilities are likely to 
vary from case to case, depending on the district judge who has been as-
signed.49 In many other courts, however, district judges and magistrate judges 
are paired and regularly work together as a team.50  
The districts also vary in the types of cases assigned to magistrate judges. 
In many districts, the magistrate judges are responsible for certain categories of 
cases51—e.g., Title VII cases in which the magistrate judge is appointed as a 
special master;52 appeals from the denial of Social Security benefits, especially 
disability benefits;53 pro se matters;54 and prisoner petitions, which are also of-
ten pro se.55 This situation seems to mimic a 1977 Department of Justice pro-
posal to make magistrate judges responsible for trying smaller federal benefit 
claims.56 The proposal was rejected at that time, in part due to concerns that it 
would establish a separate de facto federal small claims court and offer second-
class justice.57  
More than a quarter of the districts take a very different approach in assign-
ing cases to magistrate judges, treating them just like district judges, including 
placing magistrate judges on the “wheel” to receive direct assignment of civil 
cases.58 It is reported that this system of direct assignment has successfully re-
                                                        
48  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 44; see, e.g., Case Assignment and Numbering, U.S. DISTRICT 
CT., E. DISTRICT OKLA., http://www.oked.uscourts.gov/case-assignment-and-numbering 
[https://perma.cc/4ZDX-GHNY] (last visited March 7, 2016). 
49  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 44. 
50  Id. 
51  See Dessem, supra note 32, at 818, 821 (describing the magistrate judge’s role as “spe-
cialist” and also referencing Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) cas-
es). 
52  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 50. 
53  Id. at 50. 
54  See Morton Denlow, Magistrate Judges’ Important Role in Settling Cases, FED. LAW., 
May/June 2014, at 103 (describing pro se settlement program in the Northern District of Illi-
nois, that involves magistrate judge as facilitator of settlement session and pro bono attorney 
whose representation is limited to advising the client for purposes of settlement). See gener-
ally Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se 
Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2002) (describing customized, less 
adversarial procedures developed by a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of New York 
to handle pro se complaints, and considering ethics of offering such procedures). 
55  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 51 (including state habeas corpus proceedings, federal habeas 
corpus proceedings, and petitions challenging conditions of confinement). 
56  Id. at 16; see also Baker, supra note 32, at 681 (noting that a senior judge of the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals proposed establishing a federal drug court, with magistrate judges 
presiding); Dessem, supra note 32, at 808–09 (describing one of the recommendations of the 
1990 report by the Federal Courts Study Committee to establish a federal small claims pro-
cedure for claims of less than $10,000 and suggesting that magistrate judges could handle 
such claims). 
57  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 16. 
58  See Aaron E. Goodstein, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges: One District’s Expe-
rience, FED. LAW. May/June 2014, at 78. 
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duced the time to disposition.59 In addition, because these districts require the 
parties to affirmatively opt out of trial before a magistrate judge rather than opt 
in to the provision of such jurisdiction, this system of assignment has increased 
the number of blind consents to magistrate judges’ full case-disposition authori-
ty under 28 USC § 636(c).60  
Because this Article will consider the potential use of “blind consent” to 
improve the procedural fairness of magistrate judges’ facilitation of settlement 
sessions or adjudication, a few words are in order regarding the history, reasons 
for, and mechanics of such consent. 
B.    Magistrate Judges and “Blind Consent” 
As noted supra, in 1979, Congress provided magistrate judges with the au-
thority to conduct trials and enter judgment in civil matters.61 In order to avoid 
running afoul of Article III, Congress made the exercise of this jurisdiction 
contingent on the consent of the parties. Specifically, 28 USC § 636(c)(1) pro-
vides that:  
[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge or a 
part-time United States magistrate judge who serves as a full-time judicial of-
ficer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and 
order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise 
such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he serves.62  
Note that the statute requires both special designation by the district court 
and the consent of the parties before a magistrate judge may conduct a trial and 
enter judgment.63  
                                                        
59  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 44. 
60  See Dessem, supra note 32, at 821, 824–25 (describing the various mechanisms used to 
encourage consent, based on Civil Justice Reform Act (“CJRA”) reports and plans, and cate-
gorizing them as: “(1) providing the parties with more information concerning their right to 
consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction; (2) requiring that counsel explicitly address the 
question of magistrate judge jurisdiction; (3) providing incentives for parties to consent to 
magistrate judge jurisdiction [e.g., earlier trial date]; and (4) redefining the manner in which 
party consent to magistrate judge jurisdiction is manifested”). 
61  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012); see also French, supra note 47, at 39. 
62  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The statute further provides: 
Upon the consent of the parties, pursuant to their specific written request, any other part-time 
magistrate judge may exercise such jurisdiction, if such magistrate judge meets the bar member-
ship requirements set forth in section 631(b)(1) and the chief judge of the district court certifies 
that a full-time magistrate judge is not reasonably available in accordance with guidelines estab-
lished by the judicial council of the circuit. When there is more than one judge of a district court, 
designation under this paragraph shall be by the concurrence of a majority of all the judges of 
such district court, and when there is no such concurrence, then by the chief judge. 
Id. 
63  Id.; see also Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Pro-
cedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 498–99 (2007) (describing why parties con-
sent to trials before magistrate judges). 
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Although Congress sought to encourage parties to consent, it also sought to 
protect their constitutional right of access to an Article III judge. In particular, 
Congress established procedures to insulate the parties from the judge in order 
to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent.64 Thus, the concept of “blind 
consent” came into being. Congress specified in the statute that the clerk of 
court, not the judge, is responsible for notifying the parties of a magistrate 
judge’s availability to exercise civil jurisdiction, and the statute further requires 
that parties communicate their decision to the clerk of court, not the judge.65 
While a 1990 amendment to the statute permits a district judge or magistrate 
judge to “again advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate judge,” it 
also requires that “in so doing, [the judge] shall also advise the parties that they 
[the parties] are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive conse-
quences.”66 The statute also requires, “[r]ules of court for the reference of civil 
matters to magistrate judges shall include procedures to protect the voluntari-
ness of the parties’ consent”67 and “[t]he court may, for good cause shown on 
its own motion, or under extraordinary circumstances shown by any party, va-
cate a reference of a civil matter to a magistrate judge under this subsection.”68  
Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides further detail re-
garding the procedures to be used to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ 
consent.69 Specifically, the judge will learn of an individual party’s response 
“only if all parties have consented to the referral.”70 In addition, Rule 73 repeats 
and thus reinforces some of the protections contained in the statute.71 Rule 
73(b) thus further emphasizes the importance of the voluntariness of the par-
ties’ consent,72 as well as the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of 
any party’s refusal to consent.73  
                                                        
64  See French, supra note 47, at 39–43 (describing the history of the provision for blind con-
sent and subsequent jurisprudence). 
65  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2). 
66  Id.; see also Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1947–48 (2015) (ob-
serving that while consent to adjudication by an Article I bankruptcy court may be implied 
rather than express, such consent also must also be knowing, voluntary, and preceded by no-
tification of the right to refuse consent). 
67  28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(2). 
68  § 636 (c)(4). 
69  FED. R. CIV. P. 73. 
70  Id. at 73(b)(1). 
71  Rule 73(b) provides that although “[a] district judge, magistrate judge, or other court offi-
cial may remind the parties of the magistrate judge’s availability,” such a reminder must also 
include the advice that the parties “are free to withhold consent without adverse substantive 
consequences . . . [o]n its own for good cause—or when a party shows extraordinary circum-
stances—the district judge may vacate a referral to a magistrate judge under this rule.” Id. at 
(b)(2)–(3). 
72  Id. at (b)(1). 
73  Id. at (b)(2). 
WELSH - 16 NEV. L.J. 983 - FINAL.DOC 7/17/16  11:42 PM 
998 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:983  
The 1983 Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 73 provide for deference to 
each district court’s local rules on the logistics of seeking the parties’ consent: 
The rule opts for a uniform approach in implementing the consent provision 
by directing the clerk to notify the parties of their opportunity to elect to proceed 
before a magistrate and by requiring the execution and filing of a consent form 
or forms setting forth the election. However, flexibility at the local level is pre-
served in that local rules will determine how notice shall be communicated to 
the parties, and local rules will specify the time period within which an election 
must be made.74 
Certainly, the logistics of implementation matter. As noted supra, some 
districts’ local rules now require parties to “opt out” of an otherwise-automatic 
assignment of their cases to magistrate judges for trial. Due to the power of the 
“endowment effect” or “status quo bias,”75 parties are very likely to accept this 
assignment and fail to opt out. In contrast, parties are much less likely to “opt 
in” to such assignment. Thus, there is some tension between the voluntariness 
that is emphasized in the provisions described supra and the “opt out” require-
ment now imposed in some districts.76 Nonetheless, the 1993 Advisory Com-
mittee Notes on Rule 73 again affirm that the parties must be advised that the 
withholding of consent will have no “adverse substantive consequences” alt-
hough the parties may be advised of “a potential delay in trial.”77  
                                                        
74  FED. R. CIV. P. 73 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
75  See Maurits Barendrecht & Berend R. de Vries, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss with Sticky 
Defaults: Failure in the Market for Dispute Resolution Services?, 7 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT 
RESOL. 83, 93, 109, 112 (2005) (hypothesizing that as a result of the status quo bias and oth-
er psychological and cognitive biases, “the majority of disputes will be dealt with by applica-
tion of the default” dispute resolution approach); see also Russell Korobkin, The Endowment 
Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228–29 (2003) (examining the relation-
ship between the status quo bias and the endowment effect and describing the effect of the 
status quo bias as “individuals tend[ing] to prefer the present state of the world to alternative 
states, all other things being equal”); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract 
Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 608, 625–30 (1998) (examining the application of the 
status quo bias to contract rules). 
76  See Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Ad-
ministration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1528 n.203 
(1995) (referencing Local Rule 105-2(d) of the U.S. District Court for the District of Mon-
tana); T. Michael Putnam, The Utilization of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District 
Courts of Alabama, 28 CUMB. L. REV. 635, 645 (1998) (describing opt out in the District 
Court of the Southern District of Alabama). There are also parallels between this evolution 
and the evolution of court-connected mediation, which began as a voluntary process but be-
came mandatory in response to underutilization. See, e.g., Thinning Vision, supra note 23, at 
23–27; Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of 
Mediation into Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 126–
27 (2013) (describing opt-out schemes). 
77  FED. R. CIV. P. 73 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (internal quotations 
omitted). 
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C.    Magistrate Judges’ Role in Settlement 
As described supra, civil case management is one of the primary responsi-
bilities of magistrate judges in many courts, and the facilitation of settlement 
often represents a significant part of that responsibility.78 Many commentators 
and judges urge the particular value of utilizing magistrate judges to facilitate 
settlement.79 In a document entitled Suggestions for Utilization of Magistrate 
Judges, No. 3, for example, the Magistrate Judges Committee of the Judicial 
Conference explained that “referring a case to a Magistrate Judge for a settle-
ment conference capitalizes on the unique authority and credibility that another 
judge can bring to the settlement process. By facilitating settlement, Magistrate 
Judges can reduce the number of cases that require disposition of case-
dispositive motions and trial.”80  
Former Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow also has written about the valua-
ble role that magistrate judges can play in facilitating settlement generally, but 
especially in smaller cases.81 After Magistrate Judge Denlow realized that al-
most 60 percent of the cases he settled in his last three full years on the federal 
bench had settled for less than $50,000 and more than 70 percent had settled for 
less than $100,000,82 he began arguing that the parties would benefit more from 
the services of magistrate judges than private mediators who would charge for 
their services and thus were likely to increase the parties’ costs.83 He suggested 
that magistrate judges could be even more helpful when they were: (1) super-
vising discovery and thus could discern when both sides had sufficient infor-
mation to make settlement discussions appropriate84 or (2) in districts that had 
                                                        
78  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 43; Burns, supra note 43, at 64 (based on number of settle-
ment conferences conducted by magistrate judges, asserting that “mediation is part of the 
regular duties of most Magistrate Judges”); Dessem, supra note 32, at 819–20 (describing 
some districts’ use of magistrate judges to facilitate settlement); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-
Connected Settlement Procedures: Mediation and Judicial Settlement Conferences, 26 OHIO 
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 271, 278–79 (2011) (noting that magistrate judges in Ohio district 
generally conduct settlement sessions, but some district judges conduct their own settlement 
sessions in the cases to which they are assigned for trial). McCabe notes, however, that Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1) limits district courts’ involvement in settlement in 
criminal cases. MCCABE, supra note 1, at 46 n.171. The rule provides that “the court must 
not participate” in plea negotiations between the government and the defendant. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 11. Some courts apparently permit a judge who is not taking the defendant’s plea to serve 
as a facilitator in the plea negotiations between the government and the defendant. See 
MCCABE, supra note 1, at 46 n.171. 
79  See Denlow, supra note 54, at 101. 
80  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 46. 
81  Denlow, supra note 54, at 101. 
82  Id. 
83  Id.; see also Cecelia G. Morris & Mary K. Guccion, The Loss Mitigation Program Proce-
dures for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, 19 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 59 (2011) (urging that use of mediation in bankruptcy context may 
reduce funds available to pay creditors). 
84  See Denlow, supra note 54, at 102. 
WELSH - 16 NEV. L.J. 983 - FINAL.DOC 7/17/16  11:42 PM 
1000 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:983  
developed jurisdiction-specific settlement databases that permit magistrate 
judges and parties to compare their valuations of cases to settlements reached in 
similar matters.85 
Former Magistrate Judge Denlow also has urged that involvement in set-
tlement represents one of the most efficient uses of magistrate judges’ time. 
Specifically, he points out that the time required from a magistrate judge to set-
tle a matter is much less than the time required to prepare a report and recom-
mendation on a summary judgment or dismissal motion (which is only adviso-
ry).86 Consistent with this view, the Northern District of Illinois (and perhaps 
other districts) have stopped referring motions for summary judgment or dis-
missal to magistrate judges for reports and recommendations, and instead refer 
more cases to magistrate judges for settlement.87 
Importantly, magistrate judges’ involvement in settlement varies dramati-
cally from district to district. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts re-
ports that for the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2014, magistrate 
judges held 20,641 settlement conferences/mediations.88 In some districts, mag-
istrate judges handled huge numbers of settlement sessions during this twelve-
month period. For example, the magistrate judges in each of five federal dis-
tricts held settlement conferences/mediations that numbered in the thousands.89 
Other districts assign very few settlement sessions to their magistrate judges. In 
each of eleven districts, magistrate judge-hosted settlement sessions numbered 
in only single digits.90 Of course, this means that in the majority of districts, the 
                                                        
85  See id. at 103; John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?: Defining the Courts’ 
Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Ele-
ments Needed to Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 235–36 (2006) (citing Morton 
Denlow & Jennifer E. Shack, Judicial Settlement Databases: Development and Uses, 
JUDGES J., Winter 2004, at 19–21 (who also wrote about settlement databases)). See general-
ly J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713 (2012). 
86  Denlow, supra note 54, at 101–02 (observing that settling an employment, civil rights, or 
personal injury case often requires three to five hours of the magistrate judge’s time in com-
parison to the days that may be required to prepare a report and recommendation on a sum-
mary judgment or dismissal motion in an employment case—which can then require addi-
tional time from the district judge, and perhaps even an appellate court). 
87  Id. at 102. 
88  See TABLE M-4A—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL PRETRIAL MATTERS HANDLED BY U.S. 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES UNDER 28 U.S.C. 636(B) DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2014, U.S. CTS., (Sept. 30, 2014) [hereinafter TABLE M-4A], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/m-4a/judicial-business/2014/09/30 
[https://perma.cc/CZ3W-83WY]. 
89  Id. The five districts were the Eastern District of New York, Southern District of New 
York, District of New Jersey, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Northern District of Illi-
nois. Id. 
90  Id.  The eleven districts were the District of Rhode Island, District of Vermont, Middle 
District of North Carolina, Western District of North Carolina, District of South Carolina, 
Southern District of West Virginia, Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern District of Iowa, 
Northern District of Mariana Islands, Middle District of Georgia, and Southern District of 
Georgia. Id. 
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number of settlement conferences/mediations conducted by magistrate judges 
ranged between ten and 999.  
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts conducts on-site and tele-
phone interviews with magistrate judges91 when gathering information to eval-
uate a district court’s need for its current magistrate judge positions or a court’s 
request for an additional magistrate judge position.92 Although the interviews 
have nothing to do with evaluating the performance of the magistrate judge, or 
the quality or effectiveness of the settlement conferences, they do reveal useful 
                                                        
91  Although the Administrative Office does not follow a rigorous script of questions on a 
given topic, the following subjects have arisen: 
•  Whether the magistrate judge holds settlement conferences. 
•  The type/style of settlement conference the magistrate judge holds (i.e., full mediation involv-
ing caucuses, etc., abbreviated mediation, some other type of conference aimed at settle-
ment). 
•  Whether magistrate judge holds conferences sua sponte. 
•  Whether magistrate judge holds conferences (a) in all cases, (b) in certain types of cases. 
•  Whether conduct of conference by the magistrate judge is at behest of district judge or magis-
trate judge. 
•  Whether magistrate judge holds conference when requested by parties. 
•  Estimated typical frequency of settlement conferences (e.g., how many times per 
week/month). 
•  Estimated typical duration of settlement conferences. 
•  If a settlement conference does not produce a settlement, whether the magistrate judge holds 
follow-up conferences (in person, by phone?). 
•  The amount of time usually involved in preparing for a settlement conference. 
•  Whether the magistrate judge requires parties to submit to him/her position papers before the 
settlement conference. 
•  Where the settlement conferences usually are held (in chambers, in courtroom, in conference 
room). 
•  Whether the magistrate judge ever uses videoconferencing for settlement conferences. 
•  Whether the magistrate judge travels in district to hold settlement conferences. 
•  Whether the magistrate judge holds conferences in prisoner cases. 
•  Whether the magistrate judge can explain any changes in the frequency/number of settlement 
conferences over a given period. 
•  Whether the court has any other ADR policies/practices. 
Email from Thomas Davis, Senior Attorney, Judicial Servs. Office, Admin. Office of the 
U.S. Courts, to Nancy Welsh (Oct. 16, 2015, 17:58) (on file with author). 
92  28 U.S.C. § 633 (2012) authorizes these surveys. § 633(a)(1) required the Director of the 
Administrative Office to make initial surveys of all districts to permit the Judicial Confer-
ence (with input from the district courts and circuit councils) to determine the number of 
magistrate positions to be initially authorized for each district court in the early 1970s. 
§ 633(a)(1) further says that: “[t]hereafter, the Director shall, from time to time, make such 
surveys . . . as the conference shall deem expedient.” The Judicial Conference decided in the 
1970s that after the initial surveys, the Director of the Administrative Office would continue 
to do cyclical surveys of all district courts (called “district-wide surveys”) on a regular basis, 
currently every five years, and submit magistrate judge survey reports to the Judicial Confer-
ence Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System (Magistrate Judges 
Committee). See Email from Thomas Davis, Senior Attorney, Judicial Servs. Office, Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, to Nancy Welsh (Dec. 3, 2015) (on file with author). 
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information about magistrate judges’ perceptions of their settlement sessions.93 
For example, the interviews suggest that a “heavy” settlement workload for a 
magistrate judge involves two to three settlement sessions per week, while a 
“lighter” workload involves one settlement session per week.94 Most magistrate 
judges’ settlement sessions appear to last a half-day (or three to four hours).95 
In addition, many report that they spend one to one-and-a-half hours preparing 
for each settlement session and often set up follow-up calls.96 Further, the inter-
views suggest that many magistrate judges begin their settlement sessions (or 
mediations) with a joint session but then make significant use of ex parte meet-
ings (or caucuses) before concluding with another joint session.97 Less fre-
quently, magistrate judges keep the parties in joint session throughout and en-
gage only in general discussion of the case.98 Finally, although magistrate 
judges may hold settlement sessions entirely in their chambers or conference 
rooms, the interviews reveal that magistrate judges also use courtrooms for 
their initial joint sessions and at the conclusion of the settlement session, and 
may even wear their robes for settlement sessions.99 
While the insights gained from these interviews are helpful in beginning to 
develop a “picture” of magistrate judges’ settlement sessions, the interviews do 
not provide details regarding the particular techniques that magistrate judges 
use routinely in their settlement sessions,100 the effectiveness of these tech-
                                                        
93  These interviews also have nothing to do with formal evaluation or reporting regarding 
the training needs of magistrate judges. At the same time, it is within the scope of the inter-
views to ask magistrate judges whether they have attended Federal Judicial Center training 
programs and to provide information about such programs. See Email from Thomas Davis, 
Senior Attorney, Judicial Servs. Office, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Nancy Welsh 
(Dec. 17, 2015, 11:55 P.M.) (on file with author). 
94  Telephone Conference with Thomas Davis, Senior Attorney, Judicial Servs. Office, Ad-
min. Office of the U.S. Courts, and Nancy Welsh (Nov. 24, 2015). 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
100  As noted in D. MARIE PROVINE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR 
FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES 35–36 (1986), lawyers prefer a settlement judge who points out 
evidence or law that lawyers misunderstand or are overlooking (citing Wayne D. Brazil, Set-
tling Civil Cases: Where Attorneys Disagree About Judicial Roles, 23 TRIAL JUDGES J. 20, 
20–24 (1984) (reporting primarily that the overwhelming majority of lawyer-respondents in 
Northern California preferred judges who made suggestions and offered observations during 
settlement sessions, but lawyers in Florida, Texas, and Missouri were more ambivalent about 
such a judicial role)); Dale E. Rude & James A Wall, Jr., Judicial Involvement in Settlement: 
How Judges and Lawyers View It, 72 JUDICATURE 175, 176 (1988) (reporting that lawyers 
prefer judges to inform them regarding how similar cases have settled and to argue logically 
for concessions); see, e.g., Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement Conference 
Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise and Fear, 17 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 98 (2012). Case law and disciplinary proceedings also reveal par-
 
WELSH - 16 NEV. L.J. 983 - FINAL.DOC 7/17/16  11:42 PM 
Summer 2016] MAGISTRATE JUDGES & SETTLEMENT 1003 
niques in producing settlements, or litigants’ and lawyers’ perceptions of the 
procedural fairness of settlement conferences. This Article will return to the 
need for more information on these topics, infra. 
D.    Magistrate Judges’ Role in ADR 
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in combination with a dis-
trict’s local rules or a statute, specifically authorizes judges to refer matters to 
mediation or another ADR procedure for settlement, rather than facilitate a set-
tlement session themselves.101 As will be discussed in greater detail, many dis-
trict courts have established rosters of mediators, and a few have staff media-
tors.102 Many magistrate judges refer cases to these mediators for assistance 
with settlement. 103 
Indeed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 651(b) and (d), each district court is re-
quired to have local rules establishing an ADR program.104 The statute demands 
the designation of “an employee, or a judicial officer, who is knowledgeable in 
alternative dispute resolution practices and processes to implement, administer, 
oversee, and evaluate the court’s alternative dispute resolution program.”105 In 
some districts, magistrate judges play this role.106  
Finally, magistrate judges may serve as mediators or ADR neutrals them-
selves. In 1997, the Federal Judicial Center began to offer consultations and 
mediation training to district, magistrate and bankruptcy judges.107 In a few dis-
tricts, the mediation rosters now explicitly include judges,108 and as noted su-
pra, federal districts seeking supplemental funding for their ADR programs 
have reported that some of their referrals are to judicial settlement confer-
ences.109 One commentator asserts that magistrate judges “serve regularly as 
mediators in many courts.”110 In addition, by 2011, a little over a third of the 
federal districts specifically included settlement sessions in their ADR authori-
                                                                                                                                 
ties’ perceptions of and conclusions regarding certain judicial settlement behaviors. See, e.g., 
Thinning Vision, supra note 23, at 64–78. 
101  FED. R. CIV. P.16(c)(2)(I). 
102  See infra Part II. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  28 U.S.C. § 651(d) (2012). 
106  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 46. 
107  STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 3. 
108  Id. at 10; see also Robinson, supra note 23, at 347–51 (describing San Luis Obispo and 
other court programs that train their judges in mediation skills and then offer judges as medi-
ators). 
109  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
110  MCCABE, supra note 1, at 46. 
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zation or rules,111 and 10.6 percent of the federal district courts authorized only 
settlement sessions as a form of ADR.112  
Regarding magistrate judges’ service in ADR procedures besides media-
tion, the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports that in 2013–2014, 
magistrate judges participated in 735 summary jury trials, early neutral evalua-
tions, or other ADR procedures.113 It should be noted, however, that magistrate 
judges in a single federal district court—the Southern District of California—
were responsible for 721 of the 735 procedures.114  
This Article will return to magistrate judges’ involvement in the federal 
districts’ provision of mediation and the relationship between settlement ses-
sions and mediation, infra.  
E.   Procedural and Ethical Rules Governing the Judicial Role in Settlement115 
As described supra, magistrate judges began to be involved in settlement 
with the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968.116 In some ways, this 
development was surprising. At that time, Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure did not even list settlement as a subject for consideration at pre-trial 
conferences, and this exclusion apparently was intentional.117 The drafters of 
the federal rule anticipated that settlements would result naturally from access 
to discovery and judicial case management.118 They worried that mischief could 
result if settlement was described as an independent goal of pre-trial confer-
ences.119 Many judges nonetheless routinely viewed pre-trial settlement confer-
ences as permissible under the language of Rule 16(6) providing for considera-
tion of “such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.”120  
                                                        
111  STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 4–5. 
112  Id. at 5. 
113  See TABLE M-4A, supra note 88. 
114  Id. 
115  The text of this part (i.e., Part I.E.) was, in substantial part, first published in Nancy 
Welsh et al., The Application of Procedural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Tech-
niques in Settlement Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Archie Zariski & Tania Sourdin, eds., 2013). 
116  28 U.S.C. §§ 631–639 (2012); see supra Part I.A. 
117  See Charles E. Clark, Objectives of Pre-trial Procedure, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 167 
(1956) (explaining that the original drafters deliberately omitted mentioning settlement from 
their version of Rule 16 because while “settlement will come naturally in many cases as the 
issues are defined and made clear and simple,” it would be “dangerous to the whole purpose 
of pre-trial to force settlement upon unwilling parties”); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and 
Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. 
REV. 485, 486 (1985) (providing a comprehensive examination of the evolution, goals, and 
bases for evaluation of judicial settlement conferences). 
118  See Clark, supra note 117. 
119  See id. 
120  FED. R. CIV. P. 16. At least as early as 1950, judges were meeting separately with lawyers 
for the various parties as a means to overcome impediments to settlement. See Marc Ga-
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Also, the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 did not specifically identify set-
tlement as one of the responsibilities to be assigned to magistrate judges.121 In-
stead, Congress provided that magistrate judges could be “assigned such addi-
tional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”122 In the 1970s, several district courts interpreted that rather 
vague language to permit assigning responsibility for settlement to their magis-
trate judges.123 These courts probably recognized the opportunity to leverage 
their magistrate judges’ reputations and experience as respected lawyers and 
state court judges (and at the state level, both the lawyers and judges may have 
been regularly involved in pretrial settlement).124  
By 1983, the tide had clearly turned regarding any questions about the le-
gitimacy of judicial encouragement of settlement. Although some judges125 and 
commentators126 objected, Rule 16 was amended that year to specify that “set-
                                                                                                                                 
lanter, The Emergence of the Judge As a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257, 259–
61 (1986) (describing judges’ different views regarding settlement, with federal judges’ em-
bracing the goal of settlement by the 1970s); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 117, at 490–93 
(history of evolution of judicial settlement conferences); Lawrence F. Schiller & James A. 
Wall, Jr., Judicial Settlement Techniques, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 39, 46 n.42 (1981) (dis-
cussing a publication of H. NIMS, PRETRIAL 239 (1950)). 
121  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 11. 
122  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (2012). 
123  See MCCABE, supra note 1, at 19. 
124  Id. 
125  These judges objected that judicial settlement activities might run afoul of the ethical ob-
ligations of judges. See Harold Baer, Jr., History, Process, and a Role for Judges in Mediat-
ing Their Own Cases, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 131, 144 (2002) (explaining “another 
central criticism of judicial mediation argues that . . . it is also unethical for a judge to medi-
ate a case that appears on his own docket.”); James A. Wall, Jr. & Dale E. Rude, The Judge’s 
Role in Settlement: Opinions from Missouri Judges and Lawyers, 1988 J. DISP. RESOL., 163, 
164 (1988) (discussing the controversy that existed among judges concerning their role in 
settlement, including extensive footnotes to other authors). The problem of the potential loss 
of judicial impartiality when a judge facilitates settlement has been a constant refrain. See 
Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can the Judge Do That?—The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in Set-
tlement, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 45, 66 (1994); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. 
REV. 376, 426–31 (1982) (expressing concern that impartiality is threatened when the trial 
judge, in a case manager role, meets with parties for informal settlement sessions and learns 
information that could cause the judge to pre-judge the case); Leroy J. Tornquist, The Active 
Judge in Pretrial Settlement: Inherent Authority Gone Awry, 25 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 743, 
752–56, 773 (1989) (explaining the risk to impartiality that occurs when a judge, striving for 
settlement, punishes a party who fails to co-operate and recommending “[t]he judge who is 
to try the case on the merits should be barred from participating in settlement negotiations.”). 
For advice provided to judges and lawyers, see generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFECTIVE 
APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1988). 
126  See Resnik, supra note 125 (regarding potential for coerced settlements). But see Steven 
Flanders, Blind Umpires—A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L. J. 505, 507–14 
(1984); see also Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era 
of Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41, 75 (1995) (raising concerns regarding 
coerced settlement); Thinning Vision, supra note 23, at 64–78 (describing parties’ claims of 
coercion by judges involved in facilitation or encouragement of settlement). 
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tlement” was one of the “[s]ubjects to [b]e [d]iscussed at [p]retrial 
[c]onferences.”127 
Judicial codes of ethics similarly evolved in their acknowledgement of 
judges’ settlement functions. The ethical codes’ handling of ex parte meetings 
with judges, meanwhile, remains a work in progress. The original 1972 Code of 
Judicial Conduct for United States Judges128 (which was developed by the 
American Bar Association and then adopted by the Judicial Conference of the 
United States in 1973)129 required judges to uphold the “integrity and inde-
pendence of the judiciary,”130 to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of im-
propriety in all activities”131 and to “perform the duties of the office fairly, im-
partially and diligently.”132 These key principles for judicial decision-making 
did not, however, give guidance to judges about which settlement activities 
were allowed under the Code. Consistent with the principle of impartiality, for 
example, the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct explicitly prohibited ex parte 
communications as part of adjudication and did not recognize private meetings 
as a settlement technique: 
A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, 
or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and, except as authorized 
by law,133 neither initiate nor consider ex parte or other communications, con-
cerning a pending or impending proceeding.134 
Today, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges—which, at this point, 
is distinct from the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
(“ABA Model Code”)—continues to provide, as part of judges’ “[a]djudicative 
[r]esponsibilities,” that a judge “should not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte 
communications or consider other communications concerning a pending or 
impending matter that are made outside the presence of the parties or their law-
yers” and further provides that “[i]f a judge receives an unauthorized ex parte 
communication bearing on the substance of a matter, the judge should promptly 
                                                        
127  Relevant subjects for discussion included in amendments to Rule 16 in 1983 included 
“(6) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate or master” and “(7) . . . settlement or 
the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (1983). “Clause 
(7) explicitly recognizes that it has become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial 
conferences.” FED. R. CIV. P. 16 advisory committee’s note to 1983 Amendment. 
128  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (1972). The name of this Code 
of Judicial Conduct was changed in 1990 to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 
129  See WARREN BURGER, COMMUNICATION FROM CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 
TRANSMITTING PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, APRIL 5–
6, 1973 10 (1973), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/1973-04pdf [https://perma.cc/EK5J-9A8Y]. 
130  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 1 (1972). 
131  Id. at Canon 2. 
132  Id. at Canon 3. 
133  There was no exception relevant to settlement activities. 
134  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (1972). 
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notify the parties of the subject matter of the communication and allow the par-
ties an opportunity to respond, if requested.”135 
However, the current Code of Conduct for United States Judges also spe-
cifically permits ex parte communications in the context of settlement. It pro-
vides that a judge may, “with the consent of the parties, confer separately with 
the parties and their counsel in an effort to mediate or settle pending mat-
ters.”136 The Commentary to Canon 3A(4) provides an important caution: “A 
judge may encourage and seek to facilitate settlement but should not act in a 
manner that coerces any party into surrendering the right to have the 
controversy resolved by the courts.”137 That standard—encouraging the facilita-
tion of settlement but discouraging coercion—has been described as “a difficult 
one to apply.”138 Of course, one of the concerns about judges’ involvement in 
settlement discussions, including discussions held ex parte, is the potential for 
coercion to occur—or at least to be perceived as occurring. While the current 
Code of Conduct for United States Judges acknowledges this potential, it does 
not provide concrete guidance to federal judges—including magistrate judg-
es—regarding how to avoid conditions that are likely to heighten the potential 
for coercion. 
In contrast, the current ABA Model Code (which, again, is now distinct 
from the Code of Conduct for United States Judges) has placed a mandatory 
prohibition against coercion in the black letter of the canon, in a new section 
entitled “Ensuring the Right to Be Heard.”139 The rule reads, “A judge may en-
courage parties to a proceeding and their lawyers to settle matters in dispute but 
shall not act in a manner that coerces any party into settlement.”140 This section 
of the ABA Model Code also provides considerably more guidance to judges—
albeit in Comments—about what to consider in determining whether or not ex 
parte communications are “coercive.” Specifically, Comment 2 to Rule 2.6 in-
cludes the following: 
The judge should keep in mind the effect that the judge’s participation in settle-
ment discussions may have, not only on the judge’s own views of the case, but 
also on the perceptions of the lawyers and the parties if the case remains with the 
judge after settlement efforts are unsuccessful. Among the factors that a judge 
                                                        
135  CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3(A)(4) (2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2908/download [https://perma.cc/9W6C-DNNQ]. 
136  Id. at Canon 3(A)(4)(d), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2908/download [https://perma.cc/ 
XZ8P-DUWS]. How party consent is to be signalled is not defined, which, of course, can be 
problematic. See Floyd, supra note 125 at 90 (“Judges must be willing to struggle with the 
fact that the judge’s position, as opposed to the particular action of the judge, may have co-
ercive effect”). 
137  Id. at Canon 3(A)(4), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2908/download [https://perma.cc/R5 
G8-S2FM]. 
138  Floyd, supra note 125, at 89. 
139  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
140  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
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should consider when deciding upon an appropriate settlement practice for a 
case are . . . (3) whether the case will be tried by the judge or a jury . . . .141 
Comment 3 to Rule 2.6 includes: 
Judges must be mindful of the effect settlement discussions can have, not only 
on their objectivity and impartiality, but also on the appearance of their objectiv-
ity and impartiality. Despite a judge’s best efforts, there may be instances when 
information obtained during settlement discussions could influence a judge’s de-
cision making during trial, and, in such instances, the judge should consider 
whether disqualification may be appropriate.142 
The ABA Model Code’s revisions likely were informed by the significant 
literature that had developed by the mid-1990s regarding judicial settlement 
conferences,143 including research on the techniques that lawyers perceived 
judges as using, lawyers’ preferences among these techniques, and techniques 
lawyers found troublesome. In general, lawyers preferred judges to assist them 
in being realistic regarding the application of the law to their cases and the like-
ly outcomes.144 In other words, they appreciated judicial “signaling.”145 They 
                                                        
141  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). See generally 
Committee on Codes of Conduct Advisory Opinion No. 95: Judges Acting in a Settlement 
Capacity, in GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY, Vol. 2B, Ch. 2, at 160–62 (2009), http://www.us 
courts.gov/file/1903/download [https://perma.cc/69T8-Q99A] (served as the basis for com-
ment). 
142  MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007); see also John 
C. Cratsley, Judicial Ethics and Judicial Settlement Practices: Time for Two Strangers to 
Meet, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 569, 585–87 (2006) (advocating for several revisions 
to the 2007 Model Code: barring judges from trying any cases in which they had engaged in 
settlement activity; making parties’ written consent a precondition to judicial settlement ef-
forts; judicial disclosure of the settlement techniques to be used; and mandatory training for 
judges in mediation or settlement facilitation); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore 
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 
1251, 1323 (2005) (“Taken together, our studies show that judges do not disregard inadmis-
sible information when making substantive decisions in either civil or criminal cases”). Giv-
en their findings, Wistrich et al. advocate for a “divided decision making” model whereby 
the settlement judge and the trial judge are not the same individual. Id. at 1325. The Report-
er’s comments to the 2007 revisions indicate that this idea was considered and rejected in 
2007 because of the view that the issue was “better left for rules of practice and procedure 
than ethics.” MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.6 app. B (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007). 
143  JONA GOLDSCHMIDT & LISA L. MILORD, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT ETHICS: JUDGES’ GUIDE 1 
(1996). (“The literature regarding settlement conferences is vast (see Appendix E for a se-
lected, annotated bibliography) and includes both ‘how-to’ articles by judges and empirical 
studies regarding participant satisfaction and the impact of settlement conference programs 
on case processing. In many jurisdictions, settlement conferences have become institutional-
ized and their operational procedures are now codified in court rules.”); see also Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Adv. Op. 95 (Jan. 14, 1999). 
144  See PROVINE, supra note 100 (noting that lawyers prefer a settlement judge who points 
out evidence or law that lawyers misunderstand or are overlooking); Rude & Wall, supra 
note 100, at 176–77 (reporting that lawyers prefer judges to inform them regarding how sim-
ilar cases have settled and to argue logically for concessions); see also Brazil, supra note 
100, at 22–24 (reporting primarily that the overwhelming majority of lawyer-respondents in 
Northern California preferred judges who made suggestions and offered observations during 
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did not, however, prefer judicial evaluations of the case in the presence of their 
clients or discussions in which judges discussed the high risk of going to tri-
al.146 They also expressed concerns regarding the ethics of judicial settlement 
techniques that were heavy-handed and potentially coercive.147  
The revisions that led to the current language of the ABA Model Code also 
followed the American Judicature Society’s (AJS) 1996 publication of a judi-
cial education module (book, study guide, and videotaped scenarios) addressing 
the subject of judicial settlement ethics.148 In the introduction to Judicial Set-
tlement Ethics, the AJS authors wrote: 
Despite [the popularity of judicial settlement conferences], the project that led to 
this educational module was prompted by the lack of adequate guidelines for 
judges and others who host settlement conferences. The most recent ABA Model 
Code (1990) merely cautions that “parties should not feel coerced into surren-
                                                                                                                                 
settlement sessions, but lawyers in Florida, Texas and Missouri were more ambivalent about 
such a judicial role). See generally WAYNE D. BRAZIL, A.B.A, SETTLING CIVIL SUITS: 
LITIGATORS’ VIEWS ABOUT APPROPRIATE ROLES AND EFFECTIVE TECHNIQUES FOR FEDERAL 
JUDGES (1985). More recently, researchers have discovered that lawyers similarly prefer me-
diators who assess the merits of cases (sometimes called “reality testing”) and even value the 
case. See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of 
Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 403, 429 (2002) 
(reporting that the top factors motivating lawyers to voluntarily choose mediation include 
saving litigation expenses (67.9 percent), making settlement more likely (57.4 percent), 
providing a needed reality check for opposing counsel or party (52.2 percent), and providing 
a needed reality check for own client (47.7 percent)); Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The 
Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the 
Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 MO. L. REV. 473, 524 tbl. 33 (2002) (re-
porting that 87 percent of lawyers indicated that a mediator should know how to value a 
case); Thomas B. Metzloff et al., Empirical Perspectives on Mediation and Malpractice, 60 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (1997) (reporting that almost 70 percent of attorneys 
wanted mediators to provide opinions on the merits of medical malpractice cases); Roselle L. 
Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know from Empiri-
cal Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 685 (2002) (showing that lawyers per-
ceived the mediation process as fairer if mediators suggested possible settlement options; 
helped the parties evaluate the merits of the case by using reality testing, risk analysis, or 
asking other questions; or assisted the parties in assessing the value of the case). 
145  Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 252–54 (2003). 
146  Rude & Wall, supra note 100, at 176–77. 
147  James A. Wall Jr. et al., Judicial Participation in Settlement, 1984 J. DISP. RESOL. 25, 
38–39 (1984) (explaining that 17 of 70 techniques identified were thought to be unethical, 
including penalizing a lawyer for not settling [for example, with dismissal or mistrial], 
threatening the lawyer for not settling [for example, with dismissal or mistrial], threatening 
to declare a mistrial if a decision was not returned by a certain time while the jury was delib-
erating, and transferring the case to another district on the day of the trial to force settle-
ment); see also Thinning Vision, supra note 23 at 64–78, (summarizing case law in which 
parties alleged coercion by judges in their settlement efforts). 
148  Floyd, supra note 125, at 84 (“[T]he problem with the existing ethical rules is that they 
are too vague to effectively prevent judicial abuse or bias during settlement. The rules need 
to give clearer guidance about the distinction between facilitation and coercion of settle-
ment.”). 
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dering the right to have their controversy resolved by the courts.” See Canon 
3B(8) (Commentary). The Model Code goes no further to guide judges in their 
use of the wide range of available settlement techniques.149 
The AJS publication included a thoughtful compendium of judicial settle-
ment techniques categorized by “acceptability” or “inappropriateness,”150 with 
a clear caution that any one acceptable technique could become inappropriate 
in particular circumstances. One such circumstance is if the settlement judge 
becomes the trial judge if the case fails to settle.151 In addition, the “acceptable” 
technique of caucus, or ex parte discussions, which had generated debate 
among judges and was addressed in the 2007 revisions to the ABA Model 
Code, is followed by an asterisk as well as this sentence: “The context of this 
situation is especially critical in this instance, i.e., whether judge is settlement 
judge or trial judge.”152  
This brief overview of the procedural and ethical rules governing the judi-
cial role in settlement certainly highlights long-standing concerns regarding set-
tlement-related judicial practices that have a strong potential to be, or to be per-
ceived as, coercive and inconsistent with neutrality and impartiality. This 
overview reveals special concerns regarding: (1) the effects of a presiding 
judge’s direct involvement in settlement and (2) the effects of a presiding 
judge’s use of the technique of caucus or ex parte meetings during settlement 
discussions.  
F.    Lawyers’ Continuing Concerns Regarding Magistrate (and Other) Judges’ 
Role in Settlement 
Despite the practicality and acceptance of settlement and its clear acknowl-
edgement in both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure153 and the Code of Con-
duct for United States Judges,154 judges, lawyers and commentators continue to 
express reservations about which judges should facilitate settlement discussions 
and under what circumstances. Recently, for example, Judge Lee Rosenthal 
(who is former Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure) and Professor Steven Gensler (who is a former mem-
                                                        
149  Goldschmidt & Milord, supra note 143. 
150  Id. at ix. AJS did not use “ethical” and “unethical” to describe techniques because the 
AJS materials “were not intended to supplant existing ethical codes”, and there were con-
cerns that the use of these terms would “discourage judicial settlement, which has now be-
come an integral part of the judicial function.” Id. 
151  Id. at 70. The AJS publication uses an asterisk and footnote to indicate techniques that 
call for caution, such as to “call a certain figure reasonable” or to “note, for the litigant, the 
rewards of a pretrial settlement, and/or emphasize to the litigant the risks of a trial”. The 
footnote states, “Judges having trial responsibilities must be more circumspect than settle-
ment judges when using techniques marked by an asterisk”. 
152  Id. 
153  FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5). 
154  CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 3A(4). 
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ber of the United States Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules) authored an essay in which they urge federal trial judges to take an ear-
lier, more active and live role in case management, but are very careful to clari-
fy that they are not encouraging judges to take a more active role in facilitating 
or encouraging settlement.155 Rather, they observe: 
Case management has suffered from misconceptions about what it is and 
what it is not. One misconception is that case management is a process by which 
judges push reluctant parties to settle. We do not think that judges view settle-
ment as the purpose of case management. To the contrary, effective case man-
agement means tailoring the pretrial work to what is reasonable and proportional 
to the case. Effective case management may provide a faster and less expensive 
way of getting the parties information they need to value the case, which may in 
turn facilitate settlement. But that is not pushing the parties to settle; that is al-
lowing settlements that likely would have occurred later to get done earlier, with 
less work and less cost.156 
Indeed, the authors later suggest that effective judicial case management, if 
accompanied by cooperation from the lawyers, may reduce parties’ transaction 
costs (especially the amount of attorneys’ fees) to such a degree that the eco-
nomic incentives pushing parties to settle cases could soften, with the ultimate 
effect of increasing the likelihood of trial and reducing the likelihood of set-
tlement.157 At one point, the authors say quite simply: “[I]f you [judges] want to 
increase the number of cases that reach trial, reduce the cost of getting there.”158 
Recent empirical research indicates that lawyers continue to have deep 
concerns about their ability to be candid and fully discuss settlement with judg-
es facilitating settlement, regardless of whether they are presiding or non-
presiding.159 While the lawyers in this research study perceived judges as hav-
ing greater credibility than mediators regarding settlement160 and as more help-
ful in managing difficult parties,161 they nonetheless preferred mediation with 
the court’s staff mediator rather than a settlement session with either a presid-
ing or non-presiding judge.162  
                                                        
155  Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 43, at 856. 
156  Id. at 855–56. 
157  See id. at 866–74; see also E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of 
Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306, 325–26 (1986) (“[I]f there is a pronounced difference in 
the economic resources available to the parties to a lawsuit, a judge might very well promote 
a more just solution by restricting the ability of the wealthier parties to use their economic 
resources to tactical advantage.”). 
158  Gensler & Rosenthal, supra note 43, at 872. 
159  See Wissler, supra note 78, at 284–87. 
160  Id. at 292–93 (also noting that staff mediators had more credibility than volunteer or pri-
vate mediators). 
161  Id. at 295. 
162  See id. at 319; Roselle L. Wissler, Judicial Settlement Conferences and Staff Mediation, 
17 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18 (Summer 2011); see also Claudia L. Bernard, Is a Robe Ever 
Enough? Judicial Authority and Mediation Skill on Appeal, 17 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 16, 18 n.2 
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The lawyers indicated that they feared that candid settlement discussions 
might prejudice the ongoing litigation or adjudication of their clients’ cases,163 
or that judges would become biased.164 While the lawyers expressed their 
greatest concerns when the presiding judge was facilitating settlement, they ex-
pressed concerns even when the judge was not going to preside at trial.165 Ob-
viously, the lawyers’ concerns regarding their and their clients’ ability to be 
candid would be likely to affect their participation in settlement sessions with 
judges.  
Dr. Roselle Wissler, who conducted this research study, has hypothesized 
the following primary reasons for lawyers’ hesitation to be fully forthcoming 
                                                                                                                                 
(Spring 2011) (citing Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Ser-
vices by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715, 759–60 
(1999)) (observing that because federal circuit staff mediators “are employed directly by the 
court, and are highly identified with it, we share in the respect and authority with which the 
institution is imbued”). 
163  See Wissler, supra note 78, at 285–86. Judges recognize this concern. Sandra S. Beck-
with, District Court Mediation Programs: A View from the Bench, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 357, 360 n.13 (2011) (noting that even though judges are confident of their ability to 
avoid bias, lawyers and clients may not be so sure). Academics have also raised it. See, e.g., 
Alfini, supra note 19 (supporting judges serving as mediators unless judge is presiding over 
parties’ trial); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 117, at 511–12 (raising similar concerns while 
also acknowledging likely effectiveness of settlement efforts by trial judge); Sander, supra 
note 19, at 11 (“To be effective, the mediation process must inspire candor by both parties, 
something that is unlikely to happen if the mediator can later don his judicial robe and render 
a decision, perhaps based in part on confidential information that was imparted to him in the 
mediation session.”). Indeed, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution proposed a revision to 
the Judicial Code of Ethics to make it clear that, ordinarily, judges should not adjudicate af-
ter facilitating settlement discussions. See Robinson, supra note 23, at 364–65 (describing 
Section initiative and reasons for it). But see Brunet, supra note 145, at 253–54 (asserting 
judicial mediation permits parties to learn judge’s evolving views of case, enhancing capaci-
ty for informed decision-making regarding settlement); Dessem, supra note 32, at 839 (sug-
gesting that magistrate judge will be more effective in assisting settlement if he is also the 
trial judge). 
164  Wissler, supra note 78, at 287–88 (2011) (hypothesizing that “[p]erhaps judges assigned 
to the case were more likely than other neutrals to recommend a settlement range or predict 
the trial outcome” or “[l]awyers might be concerned that judges assigned to the case would 
form views of the parties and opinions about the case based on limited evidence or one-sided 
information provided by the opposing party during a private caucus, and that those views 
would affect the judge’s open-mindedness and impartiality at trial.”); see also Brazil, supra 
note 100, at 23; James A. Wall, Jr. & Dale E. Rude, Judges’ Mediation of Settlement Negoti-
ations, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 234, 235, 238 (1987) (finding that though judges said they 
would be reluctant to “mediate” their own cases, their responses to scenarios regarding how 
they would try to facilitate settlement were the same regardless of whether they were or were 
not supposed to adjudicate the case). 
165  Wissler, supra note 78, at 285–86 (2011) (reporting that lawyers perceived they could be 
more candid with all mediators—staff, volunteer or private—than with judges; lawyers re-
ported that they could discuss settlement most fully and be most candid with private media-
tors; hypothesizing that lawyers might perceive “that judges would be more likely than me-
diators to talk to the trial judge about the case” or were reassured “because the mediators had 
explicit confidentiality provisions and reporting limitations.”). 
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even when non-presiding judges facilitate settlement sessions: (1) they may 
fear that their disclosures could influence the judges’ non-substantive decisions 
in the instant case; (2) they may fear that their disclosures could influence the 
judges’ substantive and non-substantive decisions in future cases; and (3) they 
may not be confident that non-presiding judges will keep settlement communi-
cations confidential and, instead, anticipate that non-presiding judges will in-
tentionally or unintentionally share information or perceptions with trial judg-
es.166 Lawyers reported that they could discuss settlement most fully and be 
most candid with private mediators perhaps because they were reassured by the 
mediators’ “explicit confidentiality provisions and reporting limitations.” 167  
Echoing some of the concerns and goals reflected in revisions to judges’ 
ethics codes as described supra, Dr. Wissler observes: 
[R]ationales underlying policies involving mediation confidentiality and limiting 
communication between mediators and the court include enhancing settlement 
discussions, preventing pressure to settle in order to avoid a bad report to the 
court, and protecting the integrity of the trial process and the impartiality of the 
judge from the perception that information revealed in mediation was subse-
quently used to decide the case. Although to date there is a lack of empirical ev-
idence that these provisions have these effects, lawyers appear to believe that 
they do and are likely to act in accord with their beliefs.168 
She adds, “The candid and full exploration of settlement contributes to the fair-
ness and quality of the settlement process.”169  
Of course, the devil is in the details. Dr. Wissler acknowledges that the 
context of this study—a single federal district court, with a single and well-
respected staff mediator—likely influenced its outcomes: 
The extent to which lawyers view these two models [judicial settlement 
conferences vs. staff mediation] as different is likely to vary across courts. 
Views of settlement conferences with judges not assigned to the case are likely 
to depend on the nature of their decisionmaking authority, their relationship to 
the trial judge, and the proportion of their workload devoted to settlement con-
ferences. Views of staff mediation are likely to vary depending on whether the 
mediators are lawyers or are retired judges or magistrate judges. And if lawyers’ 
primary experience with the staff mediation model in the present study was with 
the single staff mediator in the district in which the survey was conducted, views 
of staff mediation based on different staff mediators might be different. 170 
Nonetheless, because this Article will advocate for certain structural 
changes when magistrate judges are involved with settlement, it is also im-
portant to highlight Dr. Wissler’s observations that: 1) lawyers’ “views of both 
settlement procedures might depend on whether there are explicit provisions 
                                                        
166  Id. at 317. 
167  Id. at 286. 
168  Id. at 317–18. 
169  Id. at 318; see also Brazil, supra note 11, at 26–27. 
170  Wissler, supra note 78, at 319. 
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regarding confidentiality or limitations on what may be reported to the trial 
judge” and 2) even if judges adopt mediation-like approaches to settlement, 
lawyers will remain aware of “the fundamental structural differences between 
judges and staff mediators, including differences in their decision-making roles 
and proximity to the trial judge.”171 
Because of the comparison of lawyers’ perceptions of judges’ and media-
tors’ involvement in settlement, as well as the partnering relationship that can 
exist between magistrate judges and mediators and the rather confusing rela-
tionship between settlement sessions and mediation, this Article will now turn 
briefly to the role of court-connected mediation in the federal courts.  
II.   BRIEF OVERVIEW OF COURT-CONNECTED MEDIATION IN THE FEDERAL 
COURTS 
A.    General 
In the late 1970s and 1980s, U.S. federal district courts began to institu-
tionalize mediation and other “alternative” dispute resolution (ADR) proce-
dures,172 and in 1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act, requiring 
the federal courts to develop plans to reduce costs and delay.173 The statute re-
quired courts to consider the adoption of several case management principles, 
one of which involved the use of ADR.174 The statute also offered financial in-
centives to encourage implementation.175  
In response, many of the federal district courts developed ADR procedures, 
and some even hired professional staff to run their ADR programs or provide 
direct services.176 Although some courts established court-connected arbitration 
programs, many more courts opted to offer mediation. As of 2011, 28.7 percent 
of the district courts had only authorized the use of mediation; another 36.2 
percent had authorized multiple procedures, with mediation very likely to be 
                                                        
171  Id. 
172  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 1. 
173  28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012). 
174  See id. The CJRA provides for a four-year sunset provision. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (1994) 
(Pilot Program). The Authorization of Alternative Dispute Resolution Act was passed in 
1998 and mandated the provision of ADR in civil cases. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (1998). 
175  See 28 U.S.C. § 482(c) (establishing an Early Implementation Program designed to create 
incentives for early compliance by all district courts with the CJRA’s mandate to formulate 
civil justice expense and delay reduction plans). 
176  STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 2 (also noting that the ADR Act of 1998, 28 USC §§ 651–
658, mandated that the federal district courts provide ADR services to civil litigants); see 
Dessem, supra note 32, at 835 n.172 (noting that the U.S. District Court of the Northern Dis-
trict of California sought funding for two law-trained professionals to administer its ADR 
program, rather than relying on a magistrate judge to do so). 
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among them.177 Overall, a little more than two-thirds of the courts authorized 
referral to mediation,178 and mediation represents the dominant ADR process 
used in the federal courts.179  
The number of cases referred to mediation depends upon the referral 
mechanism authorized by each of the district courts. Many districts permit in-
dividual judges to mandate the use of mediation.180 Some districts have adopted 
programs that automatically refer all cases of a certain type to the process.181 
For example, some districts have authorized automatic referral of civil rights, 
employment discrimination, and police abuse cases.182 A minority of districts 
require the parties’ consent to mediation.183 For the twelve-month period end-
ing June 30, 2011, districts seeking supplemental federal funding for their ADR 
programs reported that 17,833 cases had gone to mediation; another 4,222 went 
to a multi-option program that included mediation; and 1,571 cases were re-
ferred to a category that primarily included judicial settlement sessions.184 It has 
been suggested, meanwhile, that some districts may have reduced their use of 
magistrate judges to conduct settlement sessions in order to make more refer-
rals to their mediators.185  
Most districts rely on rosters of mediators for their programs; very few 
have staff mediators.186 By 2011, though, the line between mediation and judi-
cial settlement sessions had blurred. As described supra, the mediation rosters 
                                                        
177  STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 7. Nearly a quarter authorized the use of early neutral eval-
uation, while no courts authorized only arbitration as a form of ADR. 
178  Id. at 6. 
179  See KATHERINE GREENBERG, SHRIVER CENTER, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL 
AID ATTORNEYS 6.4 (2014), http://federalpracticemanual.org/book/export/html/36 [https:// 
perma.cc/XP32-BTB7]. 
180  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 8–9 (reporting that forty-six districts authorize the 
judge to order mediation without party consent). 
181  See id. (reporting that twelve districts mandate referral for all or specified cases). 
182  See Rebecca Price, An Alternative Approach to Justice: The Past, Present and Future of 
the Mediation Program at the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, 6 
Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 170, 171 (2014) (describing automatic referral to mediation for 
employment discrimination and selected § 1983 cases). 
183  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 9. 
184  Id. at 14–15 (also observing that these numbers probably do not include all cases sent by 
all districts to mediation, and that these numbers represent about 15 percent of the civil 
dockets of the reporting districts). 
185  See Telephone Conference with Thomas Davis, Senior Attorney, Judicial Serv. Office, 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, and Nancy Welsh (Nov. 24, 2015); Email from Thomas 
Davis, Senior Attorney, Judicial Serv. Office, Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, to Nancy 
Welsh (Dec. 28, 2015) (on file with author). 
186  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 10 (reporting that forty-two districts—or more than 
two-thirds of those authorizing the use of mediation—have established panels of mediators); 
Wissler, supra note 78, at 273. 
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in some districts now explicitly include judge, and some courts’ ADR programs 
include referrals to “judicial mediation.”187  
Many different types of cases are resolved through mediation—e.g., con-
tract, employment discrimination, civil rights claims, property damage, person-
al injury, etc.188 As of 2011, twenty-one district courts also had authorized the 
referral of pro se cases to mediation—including both prisoner pro se cases and 
non-prisoner pro se cases.189 
In most districts, the parties pay the mediators for their services,190 based 
on a market rate or in a tiered arrangement that includes some pro bono ser-
vice.191 There are still a few districts that offer mediation on a purely pro bono 
basis. In a comprehensive report regarding the status of ADR in the federal dis-
trict courts, Federal Judicial Center Senior Researcher Donna Stienstra makes 
the following observation regarding the relationship between court-ordered (or 
“mandatory”) referrals to mediation and mediators’ compensation: 
The majority of districts . . . authorize both party compensation of ADR 
neutrals and required use of ADR—for example, by giving judges discretion to 
order ADR without party consent and requiring parties to pay the neutral’s mar-
ket rate. This approach is especially common for mediation procedures, where 
thirty-eight districts authorize judges to order parties to mediation without party 
consent and also require parties to compensate the mediator. Another eleven dis-
tricts mandate use of mediation and require parties to compensate the mediators. 
. . . We do not know how often judges exercise their discretion to refer cases 
without full consent of the parties, or how many cases are mandated to media-
tion . . . and therefore we do not know how often parties face fees they would 
otherwise not incur. 
Note that a surprising number of districts do not provide fee information in 
their ADR rules or plans, which may make it difficult for parties to estimate 
what their monetary obligation will be. The absence of this information is also at 
odds with Judicial Conference policy to “establish a local rule or policy regard-
                                                        
187  See id. at 10; see also Robinson, supra note 23, at 347–51 (describing San Luis Obispo 
and other court programs that train their judges in mediation skills and then offer judges as 
mediators). 
188  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5. 
189  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 7 (reporting that eighteen districts had authorized the 
use of mediation for non-prisoner pro se cases, while eleven districts had authorized media-
tion for prisoner pro se cases); see also Bloom & Hershkoff, supra note 54, at 511 n. 179 
(considering advantages and disadvantages of using mediation). 
190  See Statistical Summary: Use and Benefits of Alternative Dispute Resolution by the De-
partment of Justice, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/ 
olp/alternative-dispute-resolution-department-justice [https://perma.cc/7M7W-3HN8]. The 
Department of Justice indicates that its 2015 expenditures for mediation services totaled 
$2,274,607 and there were 542 cases authorized for ADR funding; this suggests an average 
expenditure of $4,196 per case. In 2014, the DOJ authorized 504 cases for ADR spending 
and the expenditures for mediation services totaled $2,504,010; this suggests 2013 expendi-
tures of $4,968 per case on average. 
191  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 12. 
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ing the compensation, if any, of neutrals . . . (see Guide to Judiciary Policy, Ch. 
5, § 520.40).”192 
Ultimately, based on the circumscribed information available to her, Ms. 
Stienstra concludes: 
We know that some ADR programs are actively used and others are not, as re-
flected in the referral numbers submitted by forty-nine districts. We know that 
these referrals represent a fairly small, but not insignificant, portion of the civil 
cases filed in these districts. We do not know, however, whether this referral rate 
is representative of the district courts generally or might be lower if referrals in 
the other forty-five districts were counted. Nor do we know the number of cases 
disposed of by ADR, and therefore we cannot calculate a settlement rate or get a 
sense of the impact of ADR on court caseloads or judicial workloads.193 
As noted supra, there is much that is unknown regarding magistrate judg-
es’ settlement sessions and their role in the disposition of federal cases. But 
much more is unknown about court-connected mediators, their involvement in 
settlement and their impact on dispositions or perceptions of the federal courts. 
Meanwhile, neither the federal courts nor Congress collects data regarding par-
ties’ self-initiated and private use of mediation to resolve pending federal civil 
actions194 The Federal Judicial Center currently is conducting research, howev-
er, that may provide some insights into this issue.195 
B.   Guidance Regarding ADR Program Quality 
In 1997, as part of a review required by the Civil Justice Reform Act, the 
Federal Courts’ Court Administration and Case Management Committee pro-
duced a list of “attributes of a well-functioning court ADR program” and “ethi-
cal principles of neutrals.”196 Although none of these guidelines were adopted 
as policy by the Judicial Conference, and have not even been officially distrib-
                                                        
192  Id. at 14. 
193  Id. at 16. 
194  See Gregory Todd Jones, Fighting Capitulation: A Research Agenda for the Future of 
Dispute Resolution, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 277, 303 (2003) (commenting on the dearth of da-
ta regarding the number of mediations that take place); Herbert M. Kritzer, To Regulate or 
Not to Regulate, or (Better Still) When to Regulate, 19 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 12, 13 (Spring 
2013) (noting that “unresolved is what mechanism or mechanisms might be designed to do 
the tracking of private dispute resolution processes that would be necessary for regulation to 
be effective”); see also Herbert M. Kritzer, The Trials and Tribulations of Counting “Tri-
als,” 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 415, 437 (2013) (observing that if trials need to be counted, “is 
there any reason not to count hearings before adjudicators who are not employees of the 
government, which we typically label ‘arbitration’?”). But see STIENSTRA, supra note 15 
(noting that each year, federal districts are invited to submit to the Administrative Office the 
number of cases referred to mediation in order to apply for an ADR staffing supplement). 
195  See Dispute Resolution in Federal Courts: New Study to Look at How It’s Working, U.S. 
CTS. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/news/2014/01/23/dispute-resolution-federal-
courts-new-study-look-how-its-working [https://perma.cc/P68R-WTU7]. 
196  STIENSTRA, supra note 15, at 2; id. at app. 2. 
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uted, they were included as an appendix to a Federal Judicial Center publica-
tion, Guide to Judicial Management of Cases (2001).197  
Several of the attributes in this Guide are particularly relevant for federal 
courts trying to determine the most appropriate relationships between magis-
trate judges and mediators, between settlement sessions and mediations, and 
between settlement sessions and adjudication. The guidelines recommend: 
“[d]efin[ing ADR] program goals and characteristics and promulgat[ing them] 
in written rules,” “[a]dopt[ing] written ethical principles for neutrals,” 
“[a]dopt[ing] a mechanism for receiving complaints and enforcing rules,” 
“[d]efin[ing] the scope of confidentiality,” and “[e]valuat[ing] and meas-
ure[ing] program success.”198 Because there is no data being collected by the 
Administrative Office regarding the federal courts’ ADR or mediation pro-
grams, it is difficult to conclude that the final attribute—“evaluate and measure 
program success”—is being implemented in a manner that would help the en-
tire federal court system make best use of its mediators. Indeed, such evaluation 
might even help the court system to judge how to make best use of its magis-
trate judges as they work in partnership with mediators, offer settlement ses-
sions rather than mediation, offer mediations themselves, and occasionally 
conduct both settlement sessions and trial. 
Regarding the ethical principles contained in these guidelines, a couple are 
especially relevant to the relationship between magistrate judges and mediators: 
the “[n]eutral should protect confidential information obtained during the ADR 
process” and the “[n]eutral should refrain from communicating with the as-
signed judge.”199 The research described supra suggests that lawyers perceive 
mediators as more protective than magistrate judges of confidentiality and 
communication restrictions. At the same time, federal case law unfortunately 
demonstrates that mediators (and assigned judges) sometimes violate these 
principles, particularly when parties are accused of violating an obligation to 
mediate in good faith.200  
C.   The Relationship Between Judicial Settlement Sessions and Mediation 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the relationship between judicial settlement 
sessions and mediation is a confusing one. Research reported nearly twenty 
years ago indicated that lawyers tended to focus on differences between the 
                                                        
197  Id. at 2. 
198  Id. at app. 2. 
199  Id. 
200  Thompson, supra note 24, at 404–10, 413–15 (describing cases in which mediators have 
breached confidentiality, including “Girls Gone Wild” case, Doe v. Francis, 5:03cv260-RS-
WCS (N.D. Fla. 2007)); see also Art Hinshaw, Regulating Mediators 21 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author). 
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processes.201 They chose mediation for its flexibility, while they valued early 
settlement conferences with magistrate judges (and early neutral evaluation 
with experienced attorneys) for the opportunity to learn neutrals’ opinions of 
their cases.202 Former President and Dean of South Texas College of Law 
James Alfini has suggested more recently that mediators and judges may con-
tinue to be different in meaningful ways, with different inspirational “call-
ing[s].”203 Judges’ ethics codes emphasize that “[t]he judiciary plays a central 
role in preserving the principles of justice and the rule of law” and “main-
tain[ing] and enhanc[ing] confidence in the legal system.”204 Due to the central-
ity of self-determination in mediation, Dean Alfini suggests that mediators’ 
calling may be better understood as “foster[ing] democratic decision-making” 
by “reserv[ing] decision-making authority to the parties” which may have the 
effect of “enhancing party respect for both process fairness and outcome fair-
ness.”205 
But in practice, it can be difficult to discern a bright line distinction be-
tween judicial settlement sessions and mediation. Participants in a recent ABA 
roundtable, for example, discussed the processes’ similarity and identified a 
shared set of steps that participants can take to improve the likelihood of suc-
cess in both procedures.206 Similarly, judges, lawyers, and dispute resolution 
                                                        
201  See DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT: A STUDY OF THE FIVE 
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 
190 (1997). 
202  Id. at 178 (regarding Multi-Option Program in the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California; also noting that lawyers perceived mediation as providing opportunity 
for client to tell story while judicial settlement clarified liability issues). See generally 
ROBERT A. LOWE ET AL., ST. JUSTICE INST., MIDDLESEX MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE 
EVALUATION PROJECT, FINAL REPORT (1992); Nancy A. Welsh, The Importance of Context in 
Comparing the Worldwide Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, in 2 ADR IN 
BUSINESS: PRACTICE AND ISSUES ACROSS COUNTRIES AND CULTURES 119 (Arnold Ingen-
Housz, ed., 2011) (contrasting the Dutch and U.S. approaches to mediation); Kenneth K. 
Stuart & Cynthia A. Savage, The Multi-Door Courthouse: How It’s Working, 26 COLO. L. 
13, 16–17 (1997) (regarding value of offering multiple dispute resolution options); Nancy A. 
Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from the 
Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 
427–29 (2009) (urging that mediation should be permitted to play its unique role, which is 
more likely if other dispute resolution processes are also available to litigants); Nancy A. 
Welsh, The Future of Mediation: Court-Connected Mediation in the U.S. and The Nether-
lands Compared, 1 FORUM VOOR CONFLICTMANAGEMENT 19 (2007) (contrasting the Dutch 
and U.S. approaches to mediation). 
203  See generally Alfini, supra note 23, at 837. 
204  Id. at 836 (quoting the Preamble of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct); Id. at 837 (pro-
posing that “inspirational, higher purpose language” should be included in mediator stand-
ards of conduct which may lead mediators to behave in manners consistent with mediation’s 
core values). 
205  Id. at 837. 
206  Caprathe, supra note 4. They developed the following set of steps: 
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neutrals have recommended that judges should behave more like mediators by 
consulting with litigators in determining whether to use joint sessions or cau-
cuses, and being explicit about their settlement session-related policies or pro-
cedures by publishing them in standing orders, court rules or memos.207 Judges 
and lawyers, meanwhile, often expect mediators to behave like judges, assisting 
the parties with knowledgeable and reasoned legal analysis.208 Indeed, for 
many, it is not clear whether, or how, “judicial mediation” reliably differs from 
a “judicial settlement conference,”209 or “non-judicial mediation.”  
Consistent with this blurring of the lines between judicial settlement ses-
sions and mediation, former Magistrate Judge Morton Denlow has urged mag-
istrate judges facilitating settlement sessions to attend to the “Seven Cs,” in-
cluding “client control of the outcome, control of future litigation and 
opportunity costs, certainty of the outcome, confidentiality, creative resolution 
possibility, preserving a continuing relationship, and closure.”210 Again, this 
advice suggests a strong relationship between judicial settlement sessions and 
mediation. Note, for example, the suggestion that magistrate judges should be 
more like mediators in protecting the confidentiality of the parties’ communica-
tions and encouragement of creative resolutions.211 Other judges have joined 
Magistrate Judge Denlow in advising judges to consider factors unrelated to the 
                                                                                                                                 
1. Playing fair, with professionalism, including civility and the willingness to listen. 
2. Preparation, preparation, preparation. 
3. Have a judge or mediator who will try to understand the facts and law, rather than just 
“splitting the baby.” 
4. Use some form of a settlement checklist, including demands, offers, or recommendations. 
5. Be prepared to look beyond just the money. 
6. Allow sufficient time to discuss all the interests and issues. 
7. Consider settlements and verdicts in similar cases. 
8. Let it be known that the case is ready for trial. 
9. Get any settlement in writing.  
207  See Id. 
208  See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep On Looking: 
Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 409–
10, 419–20 (2004). 
209  See Brazil, supra note 162, at 745–50; Robinson, supra note 23, at 367–72 (using two 
cases—one regarding application of the mediation privilege and the other regarding the lim-
its of a neutral’s authority—to demonstrate the difficulty of determining whether a judge is 
acting as a mediator, special master, or judge facilitating a settlement conference); see also 
Craig McEwen, Examining Mediation in Context: Toward Understanding Variations in Me-
diation Programs, in THE BLACKWELL HANDBOOK OF MEDIATION: BRIDGING THEORY, 
RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 81, 95 (Margaret S. Herrman ed., 2006). See generally STIENSTRA 
ET. AL., supra note 201, at 178–213 (comparing voluntary mediation with early settlement 
conferences, in the Multi-Option Program in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District 
of California). 
210  Judge Morton Denlow, Settlement Conference Techniques: Caucus Dos and Don’ts [sic], 
49 JUDGES J. 21, 23 (2010); see also Caprathe, supra note 4 (also listing the Seven C’s). 
211  Denlow, supra note 210, at 22. 
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legal merits of a case because they can be as important, and sometimes more 
important, than the legal merits in helping parties move toward settlement.212 
Finally, Magistrate Judge Denlow has provided particular guidance to judges 
regarding the use of caucus that is very much like the advice that would be ap-
propriate for mediators.213 
Even if settlement sessions and mediations involve precisely the same 
stages and techniques, however, lawyers’ and parties’ perceptions are likely to 
differ precisely because one process involves a judge—a central and embedded 
actor in the traditionally adjudicative institution of the courts—and the other 
process involves a mediator—who is at least perceived as one step removed 
from adjudication and the courts.214 Recall that the lawyers in one federal dis-
trict clearly differentiated among a settlement session with a presiding judge, a 
settlement session with a non-presiding judge, mediation with the staff media-
tor, and mediation with a volunteer mediator.215 Their differentiation did not 
appear to be based upon distinctively different behaviors exhibited by a judge 
in comparison to a mediator—although it must be acknowledged that it is not 
clear whether the researchers provided the lawyers with the opportunity to dif-
ferentiate on that basis. Instead, the lawyers focused on structural differences—
i.e., the strength (or likely porousness) of mediators’ and judges’ protection of 
confidentiality and the effect that disclosures in mediation could have at some 
point on judges’ decision-making.216  
                                                        
212  See id.; see also Machteld de Hoon, Judicial Conflict Management: What Brings Liti-
gants to Court?, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, supra note 115, at 87, 98–99 (describing pilot project involving judge-mediator 
team in commercial cases); Machteld Pel, The Need for Method and Structure in Settlement 
Conferences, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
supra note 115, at 203, 206 (indicating that the judge should provide a legal opinion, while a 
mediator should be used to address interests); Bernard, supra note 162, at 17–18 (reporting 
that Senior Ninth Circuit Judge Edward Leavy described the “beauty of mediation” as the 
opportunity “to think more holistically and creatively about a problem than you can as a 
judge;” also noting that Judge Leavy is unusual and generally recommending the pairing of a 
judge and mediator); Judith Gail Dein, Wearing Two Hats: Being a Mediator and a Trial 
Judge, 57 BOS. B.J. 7 (2013); Machteld Pel, Referral to Mediation in the Civil Procedure: 
Extra Service or Professional Blurring?, TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR CIVIELE RECHTSPLEGING (differ-
entiating between roles of judge and mediator); Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is 
That All There Is?: “The Problem” in Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
863, 909–21 (2008) (proposing that courts should solicit clients’ input regarding the issues 
they would like to discuss in mediation). 
213  Denlow, supra, note 210, at 22. 
214  See Thinning Vision, supra note 23, at 78 (noting that reviewing courts are unlikely to 
conclude that either mediators or judges have coerced settlement as a result of evaluative 
behaviors; but also noting that if mediators and judges engage in precisely the same behav-
iors, mediators are less likely than judges to be perceived as being coercive, due to their dif-
ferent roles). 
215  See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
216  See supra Part I.E. 
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Some judges similarly focus less on the uniqueness of their behaviors in 
settlement sessions and more on the attributes of their role, emphasizing the 
gravitas that the participation of a sitting judge can provide217 and the ability of 
the judge to ensure enforcement of the agreement.218 These judges 
acknowledge, meanwhile, that mediators may be able to devote more time to 
preparation for the process and greater customization to the needs of the par-
ties, because the mediators are paid for all of the time that they spend.219  
Ultimately, even if a mediator and a magistrate judge use precisely the 
same approaches and techniques in their two processes, their different identi-
ties and roles are very likely to have different effects on parties’ and lawyers’ 
perceptions, preferences and behaviors. The perceptions that are central to this 
Article are those regarding procedural fairness, and it is to this concept that the 
Article now turns. 
III.   OVERVIEW OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE RESEARCH220 
Given the vast and nuanced socio-psychological literature regarding proce-
dural justice,221 this Article will be limited to a brief description of the proce-
dural elements that reliably lead to perceptions of procedural justice and their 
powerful influence on litigants’ perceptions.  
                                                        
217  See Knepp, supra note 42 (reporting that he prefers to use the term “settlement confer-
ence” rather than “mediation”). 
218  See id. at 105. Magistrate Judge Knepp explains: 
Where I spend considerable time participating in a negotiated settlement, and am convinced that 
the parties have intelligently and voluntarily agreed to its terms, I stand ready to enforce the 
agreement in the event that one of the parties gets cold feet. And, even in cases not on my con-
sent docket, where part of the agreed remedy is injunctive or quasi-injunctive, I invite the par-
ties, prior to entry of the consent judgment or dismissal entry, to consent to the case being trans-
ferred to my docket, and thus my continuing jurisdiction, to enforce the terms of the settlement. 
Assured by my understanding of the terms of the settlement agreement from my participation in 
its negotiation, the parties almost always accept that invitation. 
Id. 
219  See id. (observing that in his experience, mediators’ preparation allowed them to demon-
strate understanding of nuances of parties’ cases, in both joint session and caucus, and thus 
improved the “resona[nce]” of their suggestions for resolution—but also suggesting that 
magistrate judges may also be able to devote such time to preparation, in contrast to district 
judges); see also McAdoo & Welsh, supra note 208, at 410–11 (reporting research showing 
that Minnesota state judges value mediation’s ability to foster client participation, thus mak-
ing settlement more likely). 
220  The text of this part (i.e., Part III) was, in substantial part, first published in Welsh et al., 
supra note 115. 
221  See generally, E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice, Disputing, and Reactions to Legal Au-
thorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998); E. 
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); 
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOLOGY 117 (2000). 
This socio-psychological literature is in addition to, and different from, the vast philosophi-
cal literature on procedural justice. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004). 
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Research has shown that procedural justice has profound effects. If, for ex-
ample, people perceive a dispute resolution or decision-making procedure as 
fair, they are more likely to perceive the outcome of the procedure as fair, even 
if that outcome is not favorable to them.222 Also, if people perceive the proce-
dure as fair, they are more likely to comply with the outcome.223 Further, if 
people perceive the procedure as fair, they are more likely to perceive the insti-
tution providing the procedure as legitimate.224 These effects obviously are sig-
nificant for courts, whether judges are announcing decisions or facilitating set-
tlements.225  
Certain procedural elements reliably lead to perceptions of procedural fair-
ness. Different scholars and researchers have categorized these elements in dif-
ferent ways over the years226—and judges have offered their own eloquent 
gloss227—but the following summary is sufficient for the purposes of this Arti-
cle:  
                                                        
222  See LIND & TYLER, supra note 221, at 66–70; Tyler, supra note 221, at 119. 
223  See Lind, supra note 221 at 192; Tyler, supra note 221 at 119; Tom R. Tyler, Does the 
American Public Accept the Rule of Law? The Findings of Psychological Research on Def-
erence to Authority, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 661, 660–70, 673–74 (2007) [hereinafter American 
Public] (describing procedural justice findings generally and research that has identified pro-
cedural justice and trust as the key antecedents of the willingness to defer to legal authori-
ties); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Models of the Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributive 
and Procedural Justice, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 850, 857 (1994) [hereinafter 
Psychological Models]. 
224  See Lind, supra note 221, at 188; LIND &TYLER, supra note 221, at 209; DAVID B. 
ROTTMAN, ADMIN. OFF. CT., TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY 
OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS 24 (2005); TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 94–
108 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Per-
spective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 885–86 (1997) (suggesting that 
the influence of procedural justice judgments supports the idea that “the public has a very 
moral orientation toward the courts” and “[t]hey expect the courts to conform to their moral 
values”, especially regarding “the fairness of the procedures by which the courts make deci-
sions”); American Public, supra note 223, at 665. 
225  See Kevin Burke & Steve Leben, Procedural Fairness: A Key Ingredient in Public Satis-
faction, 44 J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 4 (2007) (advocating for the importance of procedural jus-
tice, distinct from concerns for substantive outcomes, in the court system). 
226  See, e.g., STEVE LEBEN, CONSIDERING PROCEDURAL-FAIRNESS CONCEPTS IN THE COURTS 
OF UTAH 3, 27–29 (2011), http://www.proceduralfairness.org/Resources/~/media/Micro 
sites/Files/procedural-fairness/Utah%20Courts%20and%20Procedural%20Fairness%2009-
2011.ashx [https://perma.cc/S5CV-P9YF] (observing that the Utah Judicial Performance 
Evaluation Commission originally chose the following four criteria for assessing judicial 
behavior in the courtroom—neutrality, respect, voice, and trustworthiness—but has since 
dropped trustworthiness as a separate criterion). 
227  Judge James Knepp has written: 
From my tenure on the bench, and from conversations with colleagues around the country, 
I am convinced there is great benefit to many litigants who have the opportunity to participate in 
a settlement conference with a judge. Being heard by someone in a position of authority facili-
tates their ability to rationally resolve the dispute. The conversation between the judge and the 
party or representative, plaintiff or defendant, paves the way for satisfaction with the end result, 
often making the settlement terms obvious to them, as opposed to some meet in the middle, 
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Voice. First and most important, people must perceive that they have the 
opportunity to express themselves, or that they “have voice.”228  
Respectful treatment from the decision-maker or authority figure. 
Secondly, people must perceive that they were treated in a respectful and digni-
fied manner.229 
                                                                                                                                 
compromise-for-the-sake-of-compromise result they feel pressured to accept. In many instances, 
litigants have firm personal convictions about particular aspects of the case, and I find such con-
versations help reconcile those strongly held feelings with the legal and evidentiary framework 
with which the dispute would ultimately be decided. My anecdotal observations about the psy-
chological benefit of such conversations are confirmed by post-conference comments, as well as 
by the often-personal thank-you notes I receive from participants. 
Knepp, supra note 42 at 104–05. 
And, from Magistrate Judge Denlow: 
Many clients are frustrated by our court system because they never have their day in court. 
Too often, their cases are terminated without the client even seeing a judge or appearing before a 
jury. Clients are frustrated by the expense and delay that often accompanies litigation, as well as 
its impersonal nature. 
A Magistrate Judge–led settlement conference can make going to court a positive experi-
ence for clients. In the settlement conference, parties can work with their lawyers and the judge 
to settle their case. Clients have control over their decision to settle; they can, save money, and 
obtain certainty and closure regarding their dispute. Clients can walk out with a positive feeling 
toward our legal system if their case is settled. They also feel they have had their day in court 
because they actively participate in the process. At the conclusion of a successful settlement con-
ference, I oftentimes request the parties to mark their calendars for a year from the settlement 
and to write me a letter if they regretted settling the case. In my years on the bench, I never re-
ceived a letter from a client expressing regret that he or she settled. 
Denlow, supra note 54. 
228  See LIND & TYLER, supra note 221, at 211–12; Lind, supra note 221, at 180; Tyler, supra 
note 221, at 121 (describing voice as the opportunity for people to present their “sugges-
tions” or “arguments about what should be done to resolve a problem or conflict” or “sharing 
the discussion over the issues involved in their problem or conflict” and also noting that 
voice effects have been found even when people know they will have little or no influence 
on decision makers); Nourit Zimerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to Counsel and Ac-
cess to Justice: A Psychological Perspective 37 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 473, 488–89 (2010); see 
also Lind, supra note 221 at 187 (reporting that voice “shapes evaluations about neutrality, 
trust, and respect” and has the “strongest influence, followed respectively by neutrality, trust, 
and respect.”) It should be noted, however, that people are also aware of their vulnerability 
to manipulation and if they perceive evidence of unfair treatment or perceive “false represen-
tations of fair treatment,” they respond with “extremely negative reactions.” See Tom R. Ty-
ler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process 
Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 73–74 (1985) (explaining that, under cer-
tain conditions, voice without decision control heightens feelings of procedural injustice and 
dissatisfaction with leaders, a result described as the “ ‘frustration’ effect”). 
229  See E. Allen Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their 
Experiences in the Civil Justice System 24 LAW & SOC. REV. 953, 958 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, 
The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 831 (1989); Tyler, supra note 221, at 122. While respectful treatment 
is described here as an essential element of procedural justice, it has also been described as 
an element of interactional justice, and even of distributive justice. See Robert J. Bies, Are 
Procedural Justice and Interactional Justice Conceptually Distinct?, in HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE 85, 85–86 (Jerald Greenberg & Jason A. Colquitt eds., 2005). 
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Trustworthy consideration from the decision-maker or authority fig-
ure. Third, people seek reassurance that the decision-maker has heard, accu-
rately understood230 and sincerely considered231 what they said and that they 
can trust the decision-maker.232 People watch for “cues that communicate in-
formation about the intentions and character”233 of the decision-maker—cues, 
for example, that the decision-maker has tried to apply objective standards 
carefully, fairly and in a well-meaning manner based on relevant facts.234  
Even-handed treatment, demonstrating the neutrality of forum. The 
three elements above lead to the fourth element. People must perceive that they 
and their claims were treated in an even-handed manner, or that the forum is 
neutral. This element is both structural and interactional—that is, people need 
to know that the role of the decision-maker or authority (or, more broadly, the 
dispute resolution forum of which the decision-maker or authority is part) is to 
resolve disputes through fact-based application of objective standards, and they 
need to perceive that the decision-maker or institution is committed to treating 
them the same as others are treated, even if specific outcomes differ.235 As 
Judge Steven Leben has explained:  
                                                        
230  “Social exchange” theory explains the importance of this perception. In part at least, peo-
ple care about voice – and being accurately understood – because they wish to know that the 
decision-maker is fully informed regarding their perspective, in hopes that this will influence 
the outcome. See Lind, supra note 221, at 179. 
231  See Donald E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on Proce-
dural and Distributive Fairness Judgments, 19 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1095 (1989). 
The “group value” or “relational” theory helps to explain the importance of sincere consider-
ation. People notice the psychological message that procedures convey regarding their value 
to the relevant social group. To receive sincere consideration signals the individual’s value 
and social standing. See Psychological Models, supra note 223, at 858. 
232  See Nancy A. Welsh, The Reputational Advantages of Demonstrating Trustworthiness: 
Using the Reputation Index with Law Students, 28 NEGOT. J. 117, 119, 133–36 (2012) (de-
scribing correlations among behaviors perceived as cooperative, procedurally fair and trust-
worthy and likely to encourage “voice”). 
233  American Public, supra note 223, at 664. 
234  Tyler, supra note 221, at 122; see also DEBORAH A. ECKBERG & MARCY R. PODKOPACZ, 
FAMILY COURT FAIRNESS STUDY 3, (Fourth Jud. Dist. [Minn.] Res. Div., 2004) (reporting 
that “[r]eceiving an explanation from the bench made the biggest difference in terms of satis-
faction for litigants who had a full trial and this effect was even stronger for those who did 
not get what they asked for from the court” and “[l]itigants who did not receive a favorable 
outcome from a trial were more likely to say they would comply with court orders when they 
reported both fair treatment and having received a full explanation of the decision by the ju-
dicial officer in their case.”). 
235  See American Public, supra note 223, at 664 (“Transparency and openness foster the be-
lief that decision-making procedures are neutral.”); see also Steve L. Blader & Tom R. Ty-
ler, A Four-Component Model of Procedural Justice: Defining the Meaning of a “Fair” 
Process, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 747, 749 (2003) (distinguishing between 
“formal” or “structural” aspects of groups that influence perceptions of process fairness, 
such as group rules, and the “informal” influences that result from individual authority’s ac-
tual implementation of the rules). 
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Most rulings should be understandable not only to attorneys but to parties and 
courtroom observers. If the parties and observers don’t understand what has 
happened, they can’t tell whether the judge was trying to be fair or not. Explain-
ing decisions in clear language, while showing that the decision was made based 
on neutral principles (like a statute that might govern a landlord-tenant dispute), 
is important in showing neutrality and trustworthiness.236 
Most frequently, researchers have examined perceptions of procedural jus-
tice in the context of adjudicative procedures, such as trials and arbitrations.237 
However, they have also found procedural justice elements and effects in con-
sensual procedures, such as mediation. In studying mediation, researchers have 
examined what constitutes sufficient voice, how party and lawyer behavior af-
fects perceptions of fairness, how parties react to mediators’ evaluative inter-
ventions, and how parties are affected by the use of caucus. Researchers have 
found, for example, that parties are likely to perceive they have a voice if they 
have the opportunity to speak themselves or if they are present and can observe 
their lawyers speak on their behalf.238 There is some suggestion, however, that 
the more the parties have the opportunity to speak themselves, the fairer they 
will find the mediation process.239 Research has also found that parties’ percep-
tions of procedural justice are influenced by opposing counsel’s cooperation 
with each other,240 and in some settings, parties’ perceptions are influenced 
                                                        
236  LEBEN, supra note 226, at 9. 
237  See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 26–35 (2009) (summarizing procedural justice research); Rebecca 
Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice in Negotiation: Procedural Fair-
ness, Outcome Acceptance and Integrative Potential, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 473, 477–78 
(2008) (describing the evolution of procedural justice research); Nancy A. Welsh, Making 
Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 
787, 817–38 (2001) (providing an overview of procedural justice research and findings). 
Some commentators suggest that procedural justice involves only adjudicative procedures. 
See, e.g., Solum, supra note 221 at 238 (“[P]rocedural justice is concerned with the adjudica-
tive methods by which legal norms are applied to particular cases and the legislative pro-
cesses by which social benefits and burdens are divided.”). 
238  See Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical 
Research, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419, 447–50 (2010); see also Donna Shestowsky, Media-
tion? Negotiation? Arbitration? Trial?: A Multi-Court Study Looks at Litigants’ Prefer-
ences, 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 30, 30 (Summer 2015) (reporting research that shows that 
when litigants are asked about their ex ante procedural preferences, they most prefer media-
tion, negotiation by their lawyers with the clients present, and bench trial); Donna 
Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate Legal Pro-
cedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 673–78 (2014). 
239  Wissler, supra note 238, at 450. Note that Dr. Wissler distinguishes between “voice” and 
“participation” in the give-and-take of the negotiation that occurs in mediation. “Participa-
tion” does not influence perceptions of procedural justice in the same way that “voice” does. 
Id. 
240  See Wissler, supra note 144, 686. 
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more by the behavior of the other party than by the actions of the mediator.241 
However, mediator interventions do matter; if a mediator recommends a partic-
ular settlement, for example, parties are less likely to perceive the process as 
fair.242 Also, some research suggests that caucus is a particularly potent tool in 
mediation and that the mediator’s management of the caucus can either en-
hance parties’ perceptions of procedural justice or undermine such percep-
tions.243  
While procedural justice perceptions generally influence parties’ percep-
tions of substantive justice, this is less true for others. Judges’, lawyers’, and 
other repeat players’ assessments of outcome fairness, for example, are influ-
enced more by their expectations of the outcomes they should receive than by 
their perceptions of procedural justice.244 This finding, coupled with research 
                                                        
241  See Tina Nabatchi et al., Organizational Justice and Workplace Mediation: A Six-Factor 
Model, 18 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 148, 164 (2007) (involving the transformative model of 
mediation). 
242  See Wissler, supra note 144, at 684; see also Welsh, supra note 237, at 838–58 (applying 
procedural justice research and theories to mediation). 
243  See Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations 
with Real Disputants About Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 573, 647–51, 661, 669–71 (2004); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian 
Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation 80 VA. L. REV. 323, 325–36 (1994) (describing 
caucus as “uniquely mediative”); Tina Nabatchi & Lisa B. Bingham, Transformative Media-
tion in the USPS REDRESS Program: Observations of ADR Specialists, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 399, 413, 418 (2001) (noting that ADR specialists who observed transformative 
mediators expressed concerns regarding caucus and its potential to interfere with empower-
ment and recognition); Welsh, supra note 237, at 809 (raising concerns regarding the effects 
of marginalization of joint session and dominance of caucus); Musings on Mediation, supra 
note 38, at 13, 16 (raising concerns that confidentiality and mediation privilege have become 
defining features of mediation and describing use of caucus in a particularly problematic 
case). Professor Peter Robinson recently surveyed California judges to discover how fre-
quently they meet exclusively with the parties in private caucuses during settlement confer-
ences. Thirty-four percent of the responding general civil judges reported that they make ex-
clusive use of caucus in less than 10 percent of their cases; 28 percent, meanwhile, reported 
that they make exclusive use of caucus in more than 90 percent of their cases. The exclusive 
use of caucuses was particularly striking in complex civil litigation (33 percent reported ex-
clusive use of caucus in more than 90 percent of their cases) and in non-family, non-small 
claims general civil matters (37 percent reported exclusive use of caucus in more than 90 
percent of their cases). See Peter Robinson, An Empirical Study of Settlement Conference 
Nuts and Bolts: Settlement Judges Facilitating Communication, Compromise and Fear, 17 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 136–37 (2012); see also Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference 
Judge—Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Set-
tlement Practices and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113, 159–65 (2009) (appendix 
containing survey questions). 
244  See JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: HOW LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH 
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 76, 83 (1983) (unlike “unsophisticated individual litigants”, 
institutional litigants who made extensive use of the court-connected arbitration program 
“appear[ed] to care little about qualitative aspects of the hearing process . . . . They judge 
arbitration primarily on the basis of the outcomes it delivers.”); ROTTMAN, supra note 224, at 
25 (reporting that the public’s evaluations of procedural fairness have greater influence on 
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showing that lawyers’ perceptions frequently vary from those of their clients,245 
makes it essential that researchers seek the perceptions of litigants themselves 
and not rely solely on lawyers’ perceptions of clients’ reactions. 
Equipped with this brief overview, the Article will now apply the proce-
dural justice literature to the three scenarios introduced supra.  
IV.     PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
As described, magistrate judges may interact with other magistrate judges, 
district judges, and mediators as they try to assist parties in reaching settle-
ment.246 Procedural justice concerns are particularly likely to arise if “voice” is 
discouraged, or if the offer of “voice” in one setting (e.g., mediation) is likely 
to work to a party’s disadvantage in another setting (e.g., trial), or if the man-
agement of “voice” (e.g., occurring exclusively in ex parte meetings or caucus-
es) makes it less likely that a decision-maker or authority will be able to be 
open-minded and even-handed in considering the information presented by the 
parties. The following three scenarios provide more concrete examples, fol-
lowed by procedural justice analysis. 
Magistrate Judge-Mediator Pairing. A mediator facilitates the parties’ set-
tlement discussions in a case. The magistrate judge will conduct a trial only 
if the parties are unable to reach settlement in mediation. The court’s local 
                                                                                                                                 
their evaluations of the courts, while attorneys give more weight to outcomes; also noting 
that studies in other States indicate that judges are also more concerned about outcome fair-
ness than procedural fairness); Diane Sivasubramaniam & Larry Heuer, Decision Makers 
and Decision Recipients: Understanding Disparities in the Meaning of Fairness, 44 J. AM. 
JUDGES ASS’N 62, 66 (2007–2008) (Court Review) (reporting several experiments demon-
strating that those assuming the role of authority or decision-maker were more likely to de-
fine fairness in terms of outcome, while those who were decision recipients were more likely 
to be concerned with respectful, fair treatment); see also Jan-Willem Van Prooijen et al., 
Procedural Justice and Intragroup Status: Knowing Where We Stand in a Group Enhances 
Reactions to Procedures, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 664 (2005). 
245  See, e.g., HEATHER ANDERSON & RON PI, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., EVALUATION OF THE 
EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAMS 62 (2004) (reporting that in contrast to lawyers, parties’ 
satisfaction with the mediation process was moderately or strongly associated with “what 
happened within the mediation process—whether they felt heard, whether the mediation 
helped their communication or relationship with the other party.”); TAMARA RELIS, 
PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS, AND 
GENDERED PARTIES 12 (2009) (observing that “when comparing what legal and lay actors 
liked” about mediators, lawyers focused on “advice and tactical assistance” while “dispu-
tants . . . spoke largely of mediators’ human attributes”); Tamara Relis, “It’s Not About the 
Money!”: A Theory on Misconceptions of Plaintiffs’ Litigation Aims, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 
341, 342, 345 (2006) (reporting research that demonstrates that in medical malpractice medi-
ation, lawyers tend to focus on the achievement of financial objectives while “plaintiffs’ ob-
jectives of obtaining admissions of fault, prevention of recurrences, retribution for defendant 
conduct, answers, apologies and acknowledgments of harm remain invisible to virtually all 
lawyers throughout the duration of the processing of their cases”); see also Wissler, supra 
note 78, at 324–25. 
246  See supra Introduction. 
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rules describe mediation communications as “confidential” but also require 
the parties’ “good faith participation” in the process. The parties and their 
lawyers know that as a result of the court’s “good faith participation” re-
quirement, mediators have occasionally disclosed to judges what occurred 
during mediation, including what occurred in caucus. Thus, the parties and 
their lawyers may worry that what they say or do in mediation, including in 
caucus, will be disclosed to the magistrate judge. The mediator begins with 
a joint session but conducts most of the mediation in caucus—or ex parte 
meetings—and learns information from each party that she does not dis-
close to the other party. Are the parties more or less likely to perceive the 
settlement phase with the mediator as providing them with procedural jus-
tice? Are they more or less likely to perceive a subsequent adjudicative 
phase with the magistrate judge as providing them with procedural justice? 
In this scenario, the parties have the opportunity for “voice” during the 
mediation and, in the ex parte sessions, the opportunity to witness the media-
tor’s trustworthy consideration of such voice. If the mediation is conducted en-
tirely on an ex parte basis, however, the parties will have no opportunity to ob-
serve each other’s consideration of what was said. This matters because, in 
mediation, the parties actually are the decision-makers. The parties also will 
have no opportunity to observe and assess the even-handedness of the media-
tor’s treatment of the parties and their claims. Even if the mediation includes an 
initial joint session, and the remainder is then conducted on an ex parte basis, 
the parties will have a very limited opportunity to observe each other or the 
mediator’s even-handedness or commitment to the provision of a neutral fo-
rum. As a result, the procedural justice literature suggests that this mediation is 
less likely to be perceived as procedurally just.247 
An equal or even greater concern arises regarding the procedural justice of 
the adjudicative phase. Recall that the mediator maintained the confidentiality 
of what she heard as between the parties.248 The parties therefore do not know 
what information was shared in the ex parte sessions that excluded them, and 
there may never be an opportunity to test such information’s veracity or relia-
bility.249 While this untested information may be quite important in understand-
                                                        
247  See Welsh, supra note 237, at 852–54; Welsh, supra note 243, at 647 (describing how the 
use of caucus had a particularly positive or a particularly negative effect on parties’ percep-
tions of procedural justice). 
248  Note that the Uniform Mediation Act “does not apply to a mediation conducted by a 
judge who might make a ruling on the case.” See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3 (2001), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_final_styled_draft.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LUW5-28PC]. 
249  See Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, “Evaluative” Mediation Is an Oxymoron, 14 
C.P.R. INST. DISP. RES. 31, 32 (1996); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Com-
plex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 337, 362–63 (1986) (observing 
that party will not be aware of the need to rebut or rehabilitate); Thinning Vision, supra note 
23. There is no necessary assumption here that a lawyer or client would intentionally and 
knowingly lie while in caucus. Under Rule 3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
lawyers owe a duty of candor to the court, and it is especially clear that they owe such a duty 
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ing the parties’ perceptions and preferences relevant to settlement,250 the infor-
mation also could be legally irrelevant, significantly slanted or even wholly in-
accurate. If the case does not settle and the mediator then discloses to the mag-
istrate judge the information that she learned in the ex parte sessions, the 
parties and their lawyers could reasonably fear the effect of such disclosures 
upon the magistrate judge. Significant influence would be particularly likely if 
the disclosed information was vivid, even if it was also legally irrelevant or 
even wrong.251 The mediator’s disclosures could keep the magistrate judge 
from being able to be open-minded and giving trustworthy consideration to the 
evidence presented at trial. Meanwhile, the parties would not even know what 
information had been disclosed. Once again, this raises concerns regarding the 
parties’ perceptions of procedural justice.252 
In light of these concerns, it is essential that mediators and courts protect 
the confidentiality of mediation communications, particularly those occurring 
during ex parte meetings or caucuses, from disclosure to the judge who will 
conduct the trial. If there are exceptions, they should be extremely limited and 
clearly defined.253 It is beyond the scope of this Article to detail general excep-
tions to confidentiality, but judges and policymakers could look to the provi-
sions of the Uniform Mediation Act254 and even consider rules that have been 
                                                                                                                                 
to a presiding judge, since any representations made during the settlement session could in-
fluence the integrity of trial. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 (AM. BAR. ASS’N 
2013). It is less clear, at least to this author, whether the duty also applies to non-presiding 
judges or mediators, particularly if the judge or mediator is bound by an obligation of confi-
dentiality. 
250  See Denlow, supra note 210 (describing use of caucus and urging the discussion of many 
matters beyond the legal merits of the case). 
251  See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) (finding that judges are “vulnerable to such distractions as absurd set-
tlement demands, unrelated numeric caps, and vivid fact patterns”); Chris Guthrie et al., The 
“Hidden Judiciary”: An Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 
1477, 1523 (2009) (finding administrative law judges “relying on intuitive processing [that] 
allowed an irrelevant anchor to influence compensatory damage awards; the framing of 
payment options to influence evaluations of the appropriateness of a landlord’s conduct; and 
the representativeness of a piece of information to influence evaluations of the likelihood of 
a defendant employer’s conduct” and observing that the judges might have avoided judg-
ment errors “by adopting a deliberative decisionmaking approach”); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et 
al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 1227, 1256–57 (2006) (finding that 
bankruptcy judges were susceptible to some biases, but not others); Wistrich, supra note 
142, at 1323–26 (finding that judges had difficulty disregarding inadmissible evidence when 
judicial review was unlikely and recommending separation of settlement and adjudicative 
functions). 
252  See generally Wissler, supra note 78, at 324. 
253  Allegations of failure to mediate in good faith generally should not be sufficient to 
breach the confidentiality of the mediation process. See Thompson, supra note 24, at 417–
18. 
254  See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, (2003), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/media 
tion/uma_final_03.pdf [https://perma.cc/SE4K-DQ64]. 
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adopted in the context of international med-arb (i.e., a process that combines 
mediation and arbitration) to address the problem of arbitrators’ awareness of 
communications occurring during ex parte meetings in mediation.255  
•  Magistrate Judge-District Judge Pairing. The magistrate judge facilitates 
the settlement session, and a district judge conducts a trial if needed. 
Like the mediator in the prior example, the magistrate judge meets ex 
parte with the parties and learns information from each party that the 
magistrate judge does not disclose to the other party. The parties and 
their lawyers know that the magistrate judge is not bound to keep what 
he learns confidential. Thus, he may make disclosures to the district 
judge about what occurred or was said during the settlement session, 
including in caucus. Again, this worries the parties and their lawyers.  
Are the parties more or less likely to perceive the settlement phase with 
the magistrate judge as providing them with procedural justice? Are 
they more or less likely to perceive the adjudicative phase with the dis-
trict judge as providing them with procedural justice? 
While the identity of the third parties has changed, the dynamic described 
here is very similar to the dynamic in the Magistrate Judge-Mediator Pairing 
scenario. The most significant differences are that the parties are aware that 
their disclosures could affect the magistrate judge’s decision-making in a future 
case, and the parties know that the magistrate judge has no duty to keep their 
communications confidential. Even if the magistrate judge does not make an 
intentional disclosure to the district judge, his experience with the parties could 
influence how he describes them or their lawyers in casual conversation with 
the district judge. Thus, the parties’ concerns about the potential dangers of dis-
closure should be significantly heightened, with predictably negative effects on 
their perceptions of procedural justice. Just as Dr. Roselle Wissler’s research 
demonstrated, supra, the parties and their lawyers should be hesitant to take full 
advantage of the opportunity for “voice” during the settlement session. Further, 
the parties should perceive less procedural justice at both the settlement phase 
and the adjudicative phase.  
Even though the roles of magistrate judges and mediators differ—and, as 
Dean Alfini suggests, they may answer to different “callings”—both magistrate 
judges and mediators should share the duty to protect the confidentiality of set-
tlement communications, particularly those occurring during ex parte meetings, 
and not make disclosures to the judge who will conduct the trial. Indeed, some 
                                                        
255  See Ellen E. Deason, Combinations of Mediation and Arbitration with the Same Neutral: 
A Framework for Judicial Review, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 219, 246–47 (2013) (observing 
that the CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration had recommended a 
no-caucus approach to mediation-arbitration and while the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordi-
nance permits an arbitrator to serve as a mediator, it also provides that “[i]f the neutral ob-
tains any confidential information during mediation and the case does not settle, before re-
suming arbitration he must disclose to all the parties ‘as much of that information as the 
arbitrator considers is material to the arbitral proceedings’ ”). 
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courts specifically bar such disclosures.256 As is true for mediators, any excep-
tions should be limited and clearly defined. 
•  Magistrate Judge Alone-and with Consent Sought Only Before Settlement 
Session. The magistrate judge serves as both the facilitator of the set-
tlement session and the trial judge (in the event that settlement cannot 
be achieved). The district’s clerk of court seeks the parties’ consent to 
the magistrate judge’s adjudication of the case only before the com-
mencement of the settlement phase, not after the completion of the set-
tlement phase. The magistrate judge meets ex parte with the parties 
during the settlement phase and learns information from each party that 
the magistrate judges does not disclose to the other party. The case 
does not settle. Therefore, the parties must go to trial before the magis-
trate judge. The parties and their lawyers worry about the effects of 
what was said or done during the settlement session, including what 
the other side said or did in caucus. Are the parties more or less likely 
to perceive the settlement phase with the magistrate judge as providing 
them with procedural justice? Are they more or less likely to perceive 
the adjudicative phase with the magistrate judge as providing them 
with procedural justice?  
 
As noted, on occasion, magistrate judges work alone to offer both settle-
ment assistance and adjudication.257 In these cases, the magistrate judge man-
ages the pretrial process, facilitates the settlement session, and if settlement is 
not achieved, conducts the trial.258 
In this situation, the parties and their lawyers reasonably may fear that the 
judge’s involvement in the settlement session will color her rulings at trial. In-
deed, Dr. Wissler’s research graphically illustrates the prevalence of such con-
cerns.259 The parties and their lawyers thus are unlikely to perceive that the 
                                                        
256  See Brazil, supra note 11, at 24–25 (observing that the local rules for the U.S. District 
Court of the Southern District of Iowa provide that when a magistrate judge serves as settle-
ment judge, the trial judge “should not be informed of any positions that parties take” also 
observing that if a magistrate judge is responsible for deciding discovery issues that could 
affect case value, she trades responsibility for settlement facilitation with another magistrate 
judge). 
257  See id. at 27. 
258  See id. at 24–25 (noting that in the U.S. District Court of North Dakota, Judge Klein has 
served as the judicial mediator in cases assigned to her for trial; she views it as “perfectly 
acceptable for the trial judge to serve as the settlement judge if the practice is limited: (1) to 
situations in which the parties voluntarily consent to the trial judge’s involvement in settle-
ment; and (2) to jury cases that are fact-driven, rather than driven by issues of law” and notes 
that hers is a “small court” and thus does “not have the luxury of multiple magistrate judges 
in the same location”); Hart, supra note 19, at 76–77 (referencing settlement in his own cas-
es); Welsh & McAdoo, supra note 19 (disclosing judge’s response to confidentiality con-
cerns raised when judge is both mediator and adjudicator); see also Alfini, supra note 19 
(supporting judges serving as mediators unless judge is presiding over parties’ trial); Sander, 
supra note 19, at 21 (concurring with Prof. Alfini). 
259  See Wissler, supra note 78, at 285–97 and accompanying text. 
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judge truly will hear or give trustworthy consideration to their “voice,” or be 
able to be even-handed and offer a neutral forum during the adjudicative 
phase.260 These concerns are heightened if the judge conducts the settlement 
session only or primarily in ex parte meetings. As noted, neither party knows 
what the judge has been told by the other side, and thus neither party has the 
opportunity to contest or refute inaccurate or slanted information.261 Because 
the judge cannot “unlearn” what she has heard, she should be barred from the 
use of ex parte meetings.262 
There is also the issue of consent. Both the United States Code263 and Rule 
73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure264 encourage parties to consent to 
having magistrate judges conduct civil trials, but also protect the voluntariness 
of such consent and the anonymity of any refusals. Clearly, however, the tim-
ing and the manner of seeking consent matter.265 Rule 73’s deference to district 
                                                        
260  See Stephen G. Crane, Judge Settlements Versus Mediated Settlements, 17 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 20, 22 (Spring 2011) (describing parties’ likely perception of betrayal by the judicial 
system if the presiding judge facilitates settlement sessions). As a related point, if the parties 
reach a settlement and the magistrate judge then retains jurisdiction, this may result in the 
magistrate judge determining whether to set aside a settlement agreement or, in the class ac-
tion context, conducting a hearing to assess the fairness of the settlement to absentee class 
members. In either case, an appellate court may reasonably fear that the magistrate judge has 
lost his or her ability to be sufficiently objective in assessing the fairness of the settlement 
that he or she had brokered. See Schuck, supra note 249, at 361 (describing risk of judicial 
over-commitment to the settlement that he or she helped to fashion); see also James R. Co-
ben, Creating a 21st Century Oligarchy: Judicial Abdication to Class Action Mediators, 5 
Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 162, 185–87 (2013). Coben raises concerns about deferring to the 
fairness assessments of judges or mediators or special masters who facilitated settlement and 
notes that: 
[N]atural bias’ might well color a private mediator’s characterization of the virtues of the bar-
gaining process he or she supervised, not to mention settlement quality. Indeed, the stakes are 
arguably even higher for the private mediator than for the reviewing judge: Only the former’s 
paycheck is potentially linked to settlement approval; class action mediators who do not success-
fully assist parties to settle cases are unlikely to be hired. 
Id. 
261  See supra note 249. 
262  See Tania Sourdin, Why Judges Should Not Meet Privately with Parties in Mediation But 
Should Be Involved in Settlement Conference Work, 4 J. ARB. & MEDIATION 91, 96–101 
(2013–2014) (identifying several reasons that judges should not hold meetings with one par-
ty in the absence of the other, including: potential alteration of the relationship between a 
judge and one party which may harm the integrity of the judicial system; the need to protect 
judges’ impartiality and avoidance of pre-judgment; the resulting outcome may not be “fair”; 
and transparency is a core feature of courts). 
263  28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012). 
264  FED. R. CIV. P. 73(b). 
265  See Dessem, supra note 32, at 839 (citing Reinier H. Kraakman, Note, Article III Con-
straints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 
YALE L.J. 1023, 1051 (1979); then citing Claudia L. Psome, Note, Magistrates: Constitu-
tionality and Consent, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 675 (1991); and then citing Christopher E. 
Smith, From U.S. Magistrates to U.S. Magistrate Judges: Developments Affecting the Fed-
eral District Courts’ Lower Tier of Judicial Officers, 75 JUDICATURE 210, 213–14 (1991)) 
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courts’ local rules may be problematic here. Some district courts’ local rules 
fail to acknowledge the challenge presented for a party when a magistrate 
judge’s facilitation of a settlement session causes the party to become con-
cerned about the magistrate judge’s impartiality at a subsequent trial. For ex-
ample, the District of Guam’s local rule provides that both district and magis-
trate judges may serve as neutrals in settlement conferences.266 If the settlement 
conference is held before the trial judge, all parties must sign a written stipula-
tion consenting to the trial judge’s settlement role.267 If the case does not settle, 
however, the parties do not have another opportunity to consent, specifically to 
whether to go to trial before this judge.268 It is also unclear whether the stipula-
tion process is one that protects the voluntariness and anonymity of the parties’ 
consent to participate in a settlement conference with the judge.269 Similarly, in 
the District of Hawaii, magistrate and district judges serve as neutrals in settle-
ment conferences.270 In a non-jury case, a written stipulation is required of all 
parties before the settlement conference may be held before the assigned trial 
judge.271 There is no requirement that the parties sign another stipulation before 
going to trial before the judge who facilitated the settlement session.272 
In contrast, some other districts have erected an apparently impenetrable 
barrier between the functions of facilitating settlement and presiding over trial. 
In the Western District of North Carolina, for example, the judge facilitating a 
settlement session may be any judge other than the one to whom the case was 
assigned.273 The District of Utah similarly provides that both district and magis-
trate judges may facilitate settlement sessions, but the judge to whom the case 
is assigned is required to refer the case to another district or magistrate judge 
for settlement.274 The Middle District of Alabama specifies that if a district 
judge is the presiding judge, a magistrate judge must serve as the mediator; if 
the magistrate judge is the presiding judge, the clerk of court must select a me-
                                                                                                                                 
(“[E]fforts must be made to ‘protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent’ to magistrate 
judge jurisdiction. This will require not merely appropriate consent procedures, but a deter-
mination on the part of judges and court personnel to administer such procedures to avoid 
the ‘ “velvet blackjack” problem’ of coerced consent.”). But see Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 
580, 581 (2003) (finding implied consent based on conduct during litigation); Warren v. 
Thompson, 224 F.R.D. 236, 238–39 (D.D.C. 2004) (discussing that plaintiff’s acquiescence 
constituted voluntary consent). 
266  See D. GUAM CT. R. 16-2(b)(1)(B). 
267  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5 at 8; see also D. GUAM CT. R. 16-2(b)(1)(B). 
268  The parties also do not appear to have the opportunity to opt out of appearing before the 
same judge for trial. D. GUAM CT. R. 16-2(b)(1)(B). 
269  See id. 
270  See D. HAW. LR 16.5(a); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5 at 9. 
271  See D. HAW. LR 16.5(a); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5 at 9. 
272  See D. HAW. LR 16.5(a); see also STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5 at 9. 
273  See STIENSTRA, supra note 15, app. 5 at 20. 
274  See id. at 29. 
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diator.275 These bright line rules acknowledge the dangers of combining settle-
ment and adjudicative functions.276 
At the very least, if a magistrate judge facilitates a settlement session and 
the parties do not reach agreement, the parties should be permitted to partici-
pate in a second “blind consent” procedure before that judge proceeds to con-
duct the trial.277 Indeed, Former Magistrate Judge Karen Klein, of the District 
of North Dakota, had adopted informal variations of this approach. If she was 
the trial judge in a fact-driven jury case and facilitated settlement discussions, 
she “always assure[d] the parties that if their case d[id] not settle, we w[ould] 
reassess the propriety of my continued involvement as the trial judge.” 278 On 
the very rare occasions when Magistrate Judge Klein acceded to the parties’ re-
quest that she serve as the settlement judge in a nonjury case assigned to her for 
trial, she went even further and imposed a “strict condition that the case would 
be reassigned to another judge for trial if the parties could not reach a settle-
ment.”279 
These structural proposals—i.e., protecting the confidentiality of mediation 
communications, especially those occurring during ex parte meetings; narrowly 
delineating any exceptions; erecting a bright line separation of the settlement 
and adjudicative functions or, at the very least, permitting a magistrate judge to 
move from settlement facilitation to adjudication only after the parties have 
participated in a second blind consent procedure—will do much to address pro-
cedural justice concerns.  
In addition, however, a magistrate judge’s management of a settlement ses-
sion (or judicial mediation) also is likely to affect lawyers’ and clients’ percep-
tions of procedural justice. This Article therefore now turns to the third struc-
tural proposal: providing magistrate judges with opportunities for: (1) feedback 
regarding parties’ perceptions of the procedural fairness of their management of 
settlement sessions and (2) judicial self-reflection. 
V.   PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND THE NEED TO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
                                                        
275  See id. at 1. 
276  See Wistrich, supra note 142, at 1323–28 (urging such separation of functions). 
277  But see Deason, supra note 255, at 243–44 (urging that “[t]he process concerns implicat-
ed by combinations of mediation and arbitration—potential coercion to agree in mediation, 
impairment of mediation confidentiality, decision-making based on ex parte contacts, and 
compromised impartiality—may justify a . . . limitation on parties’ discretion to waive basic 
rights in designing their own dispute resolution process.”). 
278  See Brazil, supra note 11. 
279  See id. Later in the article, Magistrate Judge Brazil observes that both of the interviewees 
agree that if parties agree to participate in a settlement conference hosted by the assigned 
judge, they “will have the right to have the case reassigned to another judge for trial if they 
do not reach a settlement.” Id. at 27. 
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FEEDBACK OR SELF-REFLECTION280 
A.    Models Provided by Judicial Performance Evaluation Initiatives 
At this point, the focus of this Article is on providing magistrate judges 
with opportunities for feedback and self-reflection, but the field of judicial per-
formance evaluation (JPE) offers interesting models that have the potential for 
useful adaptation. Although JPE has existed since 1967, it has focused primari-
ly on state court judges.281 Some federal courts—including magistrate judges at 
those courts—have experimented with JPE but to a much lesser degree.282 
The American Bar Association (ABA) developed guidelines for JPE in 
1985,283 and updated them in 2005.284 At that time, the ABA recommended that 
all court systems implement a formal program to evaluate judicial performance 
with the goals of “promoting judicial self-improvement, enhancing the quality 
of the judiciary as a whole, and providing relevant information to those respon-
sible for continuing judges in office.”285 The ABA also proposed that JPE not 
be used for judicial discipline, that information developed in a JPE program not 
be provided to disciplinary authorities unless required by law or by rules of 
professional conduct,286 and that JPE programs be structured to avoid impairing 
judicial independence and also avoid political, ideological and issue-oriented 
considerations.287 The proposed guidelines used the following categories of 
evaluative criteria: legal ability, integrity and impartiality, communication 
skills, professionalism and temperament, and administrative capacity.288 The 
                                                        
280  The text of this part (i.e., Part V) was, in substantial part, first published in Welsh et. al., 
supra note 115. 
281  Alaska introduced the first program for performance evaluation of judges in 1967. See 
Nicholas H. Woolf & Jennifer MJ Yim, The Courtroom-Observation Program of the Utah 
Judicial Performance Evaluation Commission, 47 J. AM. JUDGES ASS’N 84 (2011) (citing 
Richard C. Kearney, Judicial Performance Evaluation in the States, 22 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 468 
(1999)). The National Center for State Courts also provides resources regarding JPE. 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESOURCE GUIDE, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS, 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Performance-Evaluation/Resource-
Guide.aspx [https://perma.cc/3MA5-9LLD]. 
282  See Rebecca Love Kourlis & Jordan M. Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for 
the Federal Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 15–19 (2008) (describing the history of JPE 
experiments in the federal judiciary). 
283  See ALAYNA JEHLE & JAMES T. RICHARDSON, JUDICIAL EVALUATION AS A RESPONSE TO 
THE ABA GUIDELINES (2004) (referencing the 1985 Guidelines), http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/jd/lawyersconf/performanceresource/reports/abaguideline
s.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TJB-8YT3]. 
284  See AM. BAR ASS’N, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION (2005), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/judicial_div 
ision/jpec_final.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP5P-GWTR]. 
285  Id. at Guideline 2-1. 
286  Id. at Guideline 2-3. 
287  Id. at Guideline 4-4. 
288  Id. at Guidelines 5-1 to 5-5. 
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ABA Black Letter Guidelines also considered the methodology for JPE and 
recommended: evaluating judicial behaviors rather than general qualities, pro-
tecting the anonymity of those providing the evaluations, collecting data from 
multiple sources (but limiting such sources to those with current and personal 
knowledge of the judge), and using experts to develop the evaluation methods 
and collect and analyze data.289  
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to note that the ABA Black 
Letter Guidelines’ only explicit reference to judicial engagement in settlement 
falls under the evaluative criterion regarding administrative capacity: “The 
judge should be evaluated on . . . [u]sing settlement conferences and alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms as appropriate.”290 This Article will return to the 
paucity of attention that JPE has given to judicial settlement activities. 
State courts have used a variety of methods to conduct JPE. Some state 
courts have video-recorded their judges in the courtroom—and have then used 
the video-recordings to prompt groups of judges to discuss judicial behaviors 
and their likely impact on parties. The individual judges who were video-
recorded also have used the recordings to engage in self-reflection and self-
improvement.291 A few states use trained volunteers to observe judges and rec-
ord their experience in the courtroom.292 Most courts, however, use question-
                                                        
289  Id. at Guidelines 6-1 to 6-5. Careful design and implementation of JPE is essential. Re-
searchers have raised very serious concerns about the influence of implicit bias upon law-
yers’ and parties’ evaluations of judges. See, e.g., Rebecca D. Gill et al., Are Judicial Per-
formance Evaluations Fair to Women and Minorities? A Cautionary Tale from Clark 
County, Nevada, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 731, 737 (2011); Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Ju-
dicial Performance Evaluations: Why the ABA Guidelines Are Not Good Enough (Mar. 11, 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://wpsa.research.pdx.edu/meet/2012/gillrebecca.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z8X7-YAB7]. But see Stephen Colbran, Judicial Performance Evaluation 
and Settlement Skills, 11 J. JUD. ADMIN. 180, 200 (2002) (reporting no statistically signifi-
cant difference between male and female judges in terms of judicial settlement skills). 
Meanwhile, there is research showing that for certain types of cases—e.g., those that make 
gender salient—female judges’ decisions vary from male judges’ decisions to a statistically 
significant degree. Interestingly, preliminary research suggests that the same statistically sig-
nificant difference does not occur when the decision-makers are arbitrators selected by the 
parties. See generally Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effect of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’ 
Gender in Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters (Feb. 2, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
290  AM. BAR  ASS’N, supra note 284, at Guideline 5-5(5.6). 
291  See LEBEN, supra note 226, app. A at 8 (describing videos of New Hampshire judges 
while on the bench that allowed for observation/discussion and self-reflection regarding like-
ly procedural justice effects; also providing comments in the Appendix). 
292  Id. at 25–27 (describing Utah, Alaska, and Colorado as leaders in courtroom observation 
and explaining the process of training the volunteer observers). See Woolf & Yim, supra 
note 281 (providing substantial detail regarding the evaluation program and its evolution; 
also including criticism of such evaluations, particularly the harsher evaluations of women 
and minorities). 
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naires to provide lawyers’ and litigants’ feedback to judges and court adminis-
trators on various aspects of court operation.293  
B.    Procedural Justice in the Courtroom 
Two colleagues and I looked to the JPE literature for experience in asking 
about the procedural justice of judicial actions in settlement.294 Overwhelming-
ly, we found that JPE initiatives focusing on procedural justice confine their 
inquiry to judicial behaviors in the courtroom. In Utah, for example, court ob-
servers report with respect to procedural justice principles, particularly neutrali-
ty, respect and voice. They also report whether they found the judge to be 
trustworthy and whether the observers would feel comfortable appearing before 
                                                        
293  See JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 281; Kourlis & 
Singer, supra note 282, at 18. My colleagues and I reviewed, for example, questionnaires 
from New Hampshire, Minnesota, New Jersey, Arizona, Kansas, Hawaii, Colorado and 
Utah, as well as a template developed for States by IAALS (Institute for the Advancement of 
Legal Systems) (on file with the author). These questionnaires typically solicit feedback 
from lawyers rather than clients. See LEBEN, supra note 226, at 21–23 (describing process 
used in Hennepin County, including written feedback and review with team of judges, attor-
neys and also describing the appellate judge process used by Kansas Commission on Judicial 
Performance, with evaluations available online more recently taken over by the Kansas Bar 
Assoc.); NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COURT 
EXCELLENCE, 16–18 (2nd ed. 2013), http://www.courtexcellence.com/~/media/Microsites/Fi 
les/ICCE/The%20International%20Framework%202E%202014%20V3.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/D3B4-UK4E]; MARCY R. PODKOPACZ, REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL 
DEVELOPMENT SURVEY 16 (2005) (detailing Fourth Judicial District Of Minnesota and 
Hennepin County process); Court Implementation, PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR JUDGES & 
CTS., http://www.proceduralfairness.org/Court-Implementation [https://perma.cc/MJV7-
GUGW] (last visited Apr. 27, 2016) (listing examples of courts that have conducted proce-
dural justice evaluation). 
294  We also reviewed researchers’ efforts to examine the judge’s role in settlement. See the 
following for citations to some of the research: BRAZIL, supra note 144 (researchers sur-
veyed lawyers in the mid-1980s regarding their general perceptions of judicial settlement 
behaviors); PROVINE, supra note 100 (noting that lawyers prefer a settlement judge who 
points out evidence or law that lawyers misunderstand or are overlooking); Brazil, supra 
note 100, at 22–24 (reporting primarily that the overwhelming majority of lawyer-
respondents in Northern California preferred judges who made suggestions and offered ob-
servations during settlement sessions, but lawyers in Florida, Texas and Missouri were more 
ambivalent about such a judicial role); Rude & Wall, supra note 100, at 176–77 (reporting 
that lawyers prefer judges to inform them regarding how similar cases have settled and to 
argue logically for concessions); see also Jean-Francois Roberge, “Sense of Access to Jus-
tice” As a Framework for Civil Procedure Justice Reform: An Empirical Assessment of Ju-
dicial Settlement Conferences in Quebec (Canada), 17 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 323, 
329–41 (2016) (surveying empirical research regarding judicial settlement behaviors as well 
as metrics that have been developed to assess access to justice). More recently, in a series of 
articles, Prof. Peter Robinson has reported the results of a survey of judges, who reported 
their perceptions of the techniques they use to effect settlement. See, e.g., Robinson, supra 
note 100, at 142–46 (Case law and disciplinary proceedings also reveal parties’ perceptions 
of and conclusions regarding certain judicial settlement behaviors); Thinning Vision, supra 
note 23, at 64–78 (containing an extensive bibliography). 
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him or her.295 The observers’ narratives are coded, summarized and compiled 
into a two to three page report that identifies “widely agreed-upon themes, mi-
nority observations, and anomalous comments.”296 These observations involve 
judicial behavior in the courtroom. It does not appear that the observers evalu-
ate settlement sessions. 
Questionnaires that include procedural justice elements also tend to focus 
on judicial behaviors in the courtroom. Among the questionnaires that my col-
leagues and I examined, for example, was the National Center for State Courts’ 
(NCSC) “Trial Court Performance Measures” (CourTools), which is perhaps 
the most widely used measure for state court assessments of judicial and court 
management practices.297 Most relevant to our procedural justice analysis was 
the “Access and Fairness Survey.”298 The survey’s “definition” and “purpose” 
sections suggest that it can be used to assess perceptions of several key proce-
dural justice elements.299 On a five-point scale (ranging from strongly disagree 
to strongly agree), however, only five Fairness Questions are suggested in 
CourTools: 
•  The way my case was handled was fair. 
•  The judge listened to my side of the story before he or she made a deci-
sion. 
•  The judge had the information necessary to make good decisions about my 
case. 
•  I was treated the same as everyone else. 
•  As I leave the court, I know what to do next about my case.300 
                                                        
295  See Woolf & Yim, supra note 281, at 87. 
296  Id. 
297  See Trial Court Performance Measures, COURTOOLS, http://www.courtools.org/Trial-
Court-Performance-Measures.aspx [https://perma.cc/2XHW-LWMC] (last visited Apr. 27, 
2016) (follow “Overview Brochure” hyperlink) The NCSC performance measures include: 
“Access and Fairness, Clearance Rates, Time to Disposition, Age of Active Pending Case-
load, Trial Date Certainty, Reliability and Integrity of Case Files, Collection of Monetary 
Penalties, Effective Use of Jurors, Court Employee Satisfaction and Cost Per Case.” Id. 
298  See Access and Fairness, COURTOOLS (2005) http://www.courtools.org/~/media/Micro 
sites/Files/CourTools/courtools_Trial_measure1_access_and_fairness.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/B2DM-XK7U]. 
299  Id. Specifically, the definition and purpose sections for the Access and Fairness Survey 
state: 
Definition: Ratings of court users on the court’s accessibility and its treatment of customers in 
terms of fairness, equality, and respect. 
Purpose: Many assume that “winning” or “losing” is what matters most to citizens when dealing 
with the courts. However, research consistently shows that positive perceptions of court experi-
ence are shaped more by court users’ perceptions of how they are treated in court, and whether 
the court’s process of making decisions seems fair. This measure provides a tool for surveying 
all court users about their experience in the courthouse. Comparison of results by location, divi-
sion, type of customer, and across courts can inform and improve court management practices. 
Id. 
300  Id. Relevant questions in the “Access to the Court” section include: “Court staff paid at-
tention to my needs” and “I was treated with courtesy and respect.” Id. 
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Although some of these CourTools questions have the potential to apply to 
judicial settlement conferences, the overall frame assumes judicial decision-
making.  
States that engage in JPE efforts similarly frame most of their evaluation 
questions in terms of judicial performance in the courtroom. Colorado’s JPE 
non-lawyer questionnaire, for example, which is used for retention purposes, 
requests feedback regarding the following:  
•  Treating participants in the case politely and with respect. 
•  Giving participants an opportunity to be heard. 
•  Giving each side enough time to present his or her case. 
•  Making sure participants understand the proceedings and what is going on 
in the courtroom.301  
Kansas’ lawyers also complete surveys in order to provide feedback to the 
state’s appellate judges, with several questions focused on procedural fairness, 
including: 
•  Whether the judge is fair and impartial to each side; 
•  Whether the judge allows parties to present their arguments and answer 
questions; 
•  Whether the judge is courteous toward attorneys; 
•  Whether the judge participates in oral argument with good questions and 
comments; 
•  Whether the judge writes clear opinions; and 
•  Whether the judge writes opinions that adequately explain the basis of the 
court’s decisions.302 
Once again, the focus is on judges’ courtroom demeanor and decision-
making, not on the facilitation of settlement. 
C.   Procedural Justice in Settlement Sessions 
There are a few courts that are specifically creating opportunities for judg-
es to reflect on the impact of their behaviors while in settlement sessions. In 
Alberta, Canada, for example, the court has video-recorded a small number of 
judicial settlement sessions for training purposes.303 Specifically, three judges 
agreed to be video-recorded as they facilitated settlement of a hypothetical 
                                                        
301  COLO. OFF. JUD. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION, SURVEY OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (on file 
with the author). 
302  See LEBEN, supra note 226, at 23. The Center for Court Innovation has also developed 
surveys to assess parties’ procedural justice perceptions. See EMILY GOLD LAGRATTA & 
ELISE JENSEN, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, MEASURING PERCEPTIONS OF FAIRNESS: AN 
EVALUATION TOOLKIT (2015), http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/docu 
ments/P_J_Evaluation.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE56-BHVQ]. 
303  See Lawrence E. Susskind, Judicial Dispute Resolution: An Approach Evolving to Suit 
Litigants’ Needs, 20 DISP. RESOL. MAG., (Spring 2014), http://www.american 
bar.org/publications/dispute_resolution_magazine/2014/spring/judicial-dispute-resolution--
an-approach-evolving-to-suit-litiga.html [https://perma.cc/5L4W-KE47]. 
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case.304 The recordings revealed quite different approaches to facilitating set-
tlement.305 A larger group of judges then viewed and discussed these differ-
ences as part of training they received in “judicial dispute resolution” skills.306 
Of course, the judges who were video-recorded also engaged in individual self-
reflection. 307 In the U.S. District Court of the Northern District of California, 
meanwhile, the head of the mediation program regularly conducts “practicums” 
with interested magistrate judges regarding the facilitation of settlement ses-
sions and appropriate use of other ADR processes.308 This practice builds on 
the “brown bag” sessions that the Northern District has long held with its medi-
ators,309 and the “reflective practice groups” that mediators are beginning to 
form around the country.310 
Meanwhile, some states’ judicial evaluation surveys include a few ques-
tions that address judicial settlement efforts. The New Jersey JPE process, for 
example, uses survey data to provide confidential information to individual 
judges, and one question specifically asks litigants to comment on settlement: 
If settlement was appropriate in this case, please assess the judge’s settlement ac-
tivities (whether or not the case was settled) with respect to: 
•  Thoughtfully exploring the strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case 
in settlement discussions with the attorney. 
•  Credibility of the judge’s settlement appraisals. 
•  Skills in effecting compromise. 
•  Absence of coercion, threat or the like in settlement efforts.311 
The Hawaii Circuit Court Judicial Performance Evaluation Questionnaire 
asks for comments on these additional settlement-related points:  
•  “Appropriateness of the judge’s settlement/plea initiatives.” 
•  “Facilitation in development of options for settlement/plea.” 
•  “Ability to enhance the settlement process by creating consensus or to fa-
cilitate the plea agreement process.”312 
                                                        
304  Id. 
305  Id. 
306  Id. 
307  Id. 
308  See Becoming a Neutral: Mediation Continuing Education Requirements, U.S. DISTRICT 
CT. N.D. CAL., http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/becomeaneutral [https://perma.cc/5A3Y-
48UD]. 
309  Id. 
310  Kenneth H. Fox, Mirror As Prism: Reimagining Reflexive Dispute Resolution Practice in 
a Globalized World, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 41, 44–50 (2014) (describing reflective prac-
tice); David A. Hoffman, Mediation, Multiple Minds, and Managing the Negotiation Within, 
16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 297, 326 (2011). 
311  RICHARD J. YOUNG, N.J. ADMIN. OFF. CTS., THE NEW JERSEY JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION PROGRAM: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PROGRAM’S IMPACT ON JUDICIAL 
PERFORMANCE (1997) (on file with author). Other questions asked about “Comportment”—
e.g., listening skills, even-handed treatment of lawyers, courtesy, patience, etc.—but not spe-
cifically in a settlement frame. Id. 
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It is noteworthy that although these questions ask generally about judges’ 
“facilitation” of settlement, the concrete interventions specifically referenced 
are largely limited to judges’ provision of advice or assessments of parties’ cas-
es and settlement proposals. In other words, these questions either do not ex-
plain what is meant by judicial “facilitation” of settlement or tend to assume 
that such facilitation consists primarily of judicial evaluation.313 The questions 
do not explore whether or not judges facilitate settlement by, for example, ask-
ing questions of the parties, encouraging the clients to speak, inviting discus-
sion of both legal and non-legal issues that are important to the parties, explicit-
ly demonstrating that they have heard and understood the parties’ most 
important points, trying to ensure that the parties heard and understood each 
other, treating the parties even-handedly and with respect, or encouraging the 
parties to develop their own settlement proposals. These sorts of questions—
regarding voice, trustworthy consideration, and even-handed, respectful treat-
ment—are more likely to elicit feedback that will be useful to courts and indi-
vidual judges interested in learning whether parties experience procedural fair-
ness in settlement sessions. 
In contrast to the relative lack of interest in evaluating judicial settlement 
efforts, court-connected consensual ADR procedures—especially mediation—
have often and appropriately been subject to evaluation. Some have looked be-
yond their own court or research project and have called for standardized data 
collection across many types of courts and cases to facilitate nuanced and 
thoughtful analysis of what occurs in ADR procedures and, specifically, to 
learn what contributes to the perception of these procedures as substantively 
and procedurally just.314 
                                                                                                                                 
312  HAW. JUD. DISTRICT CT., JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT QUESTIONNAIRE (2010) (on file with 
the author); see also THE JUD., ST. OF HAW., JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE PROGRAM 2013 
REPORT, (2013), http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/news_and_reports_docs/judicial_perfor 
mance_program_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4FV-L7DN] (tables reporting evaluation re-
sults for judges). 
313  Within the field of mediation—and despite the prevalence of training that emphasizes a 
facilitative approach—many mediators tend to share their opinions regarding the strengths 
and weaknesses of parties’ cases. Recent research suggests, however, that there may be sig-
nificant geographic variation in mediators’ use of this technique. See Thomas J. 
Stipanowich, Insights on Mediator Practices and Perceptions, 22 DISP. RESOL. MAG., 6, 10 
(Winter 2016) (reporting empirical research and comparing responses to the statement “I as-
sess and share my opinion regarding the legal strength of arguments made by parties and/or 
counsel”). 
314  Much of the court-connected evaluation work has been done in the context of mediation 
programs, given their widespread use in the US courts. Several years ago, the ABA Section 
of Dispute Resolution’s Research and Statistics Task Force, chaired by Professor Lisa Bing-
ham, developed a list of key data elements every court should collect on mediation pro-
grams. This project led to a major effort on the part of the Resolution Systems Institute 
(RSI), in collaboration with the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, to develop model post-
mediation questionnaires (available at http://www.aboutrsi.org/publications.php?sID=12). 
Over the years, numerous efforts have been undertaken—for example, by the ABA Section 
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Given this existing mediation research, the procedural justice literature and 
the lack of attention to procedural justice in judicial settlement, Bobbi 
McAdoo, Donna Stienstra and I decided to update and expand upon the evalua-
tion and research questionnaires currently being used by court systems to ask 
questions regarding the effectiveness and procedural fairness of judicial settle-
ment sessions. This Article will not go into detail regarding the specifics of our 
effort, which is reported elsewhere.315 Rather, this Article will describe only 
briefly the approach that we used in the development of our questionnaire, 
which is directed at lawyers and can be administered by courts after formal ju-
dicial settlement sessions in individual civil, non-family cases.316 The question-
naire is attached as an appendix. My colleagues and I hope our questionnaire 
will expand the current state of knowledge regarding judicial settlement efforts 
as a result of the questionnaire’s: 
•  Specific focus on concrete judicial actions within settlement;  
•  Exploration of the relationship between these concrete judicial actions and 
lawyers’ and litigants’ perceptions of procedural and substantive jus-
tice; 
•  Simultaneous exploration of the relationship between these concrete judi-
cial actions and lawyers’ and litigants’ perceptions of the actions’ help-
fulness; 
•  Importation into judicial settlement of some of the questions that have 
been used in the evaluation of mediation; and 
•  Exploration of contextual factors that appear likely to influence lawyers’ 
and litigants’ understanding of judicial actions and resulting percep-
tions, such as whether the judge is the presiding judge, whether the set-
tlement actions occurred in joint session or caucus, and whether the lit-
igants suggested or requested the settlement session. 
We hope that use of our questionnaire will enable judges, courts, and re-
searchers to “see” the connections among lawyers’ perceptions of procedural 
                                                                                                                                 
of Dispute Resolution’s Court ADR Committee, various law schools and university-related 
centers to encourage collection of standardized data. 
315  See Welsh et al., supra note 115 (providing substantial detail regarding the potential con-
nections among particular judicial behaviors, the context in which they occurred, and the 
effects upon lawyers’ and litigants’ perceptions). 
316  My colleagues and I must note that in developing the questionnaire, we relied first and 
foremost on the procedural justice literature. We also turned to questionnaires that have been 
developed to evaluate mediation. In addition, we benefitted greatly from telephone confer-
ence calls with federal magistrate judges and state court judges to learn about the context in 
which settlement discussions occur and to identify specific settlement techniques used in 
these conferences. We also distributed the draft to several other state and federal judges, as 
well as to several members of a Law and Society Association-sponsored International Re-
search Collaborative on Judicial Dispute Resolution and received extremely helpful written 
and oral comments. After publishing our draft as a work-in-progress in a book on judicial 
dispute resolution, we distributed it to practicing lawyers in the United States and researchers 
in procedural justice and court ADR. Again, we received helpful written and oral comments 
and have made substantial revisions. Next steps include developing instructions and testing 
protocols for the questionnaire and, of course, testing the instrument. 
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justice, particular judicial actions, and the context within which these actions 
occurred. The questionnaire also permits judges, courts and researchers to con-
sider, simultaneously, lawyers’ (and hopefully, in the future, parties’) percep-
tions of the courts’ achievement of two goals that often seem in tension: effec-
tiveness in moving the parties toward settlement and attention to fairness, both 
substantive and procedural. 
We also envision that data collected through use of this questionnaire could 
serve several purposes. Most relevant to this Article, the questionnaire could be 
used to provide feedback to individual judges. In addition, some individual 
courts or court systems might choose to use the questionnaire to assist with 
monitoring and evaluation efforts, and researchers might use it to support larger 
empirical research projects that seek to understand judicial settlement efforts 
and their effects. 
My colleagues and I recognize that our comprehensive questionnaire might 
not be used in its entirety by any given court. Still, we hope the questionnaire 
will provide a starting point for others and will contribute to a concrete focus 
on the importance of procedural fairness to judicial settlement efforts, the col-
lection of reliable data about judicial settlement, the development of compara-
ble data across courts, and perhaps even the development of comparable data 
across different settlement procedures. 
CONCLUSION 
Federal magistrate judges play a key role in producing settlements, alone 
and in partnership with other magistrate judges, district judges, and mediators. 
However, magistrate judges’ involvement in settlement occurs within the con-
text of institutional evolution on several fronts. First, magistrate judges them-
selves represent a relatively recent addition to the federal courts, and their re-
sponsibilities vary dramatically among district courts. As a result, magistrate 
judges in some district courts conduct settlement sessions almost exclusively, 
while others do not conduct settlement sessions at all. Second, the procedural 
and ethical rules regarding judicial engagement in settlement continue to evolve 
as they respond to the tensions that inevitably arise when a traditionally adjudi-
cative institution relies heavily on settlement in order to meet its dispute resolu-
tion and lawmaking obligations to the public. It is problematic that there is so 
little guidance provided to magistrate judges regarding the circumstances that 
are most likely to trigger perceptions of coercion and procedural unfairness. 
Third, although Congress clearly has directed the federal courts to offer ADR, 
and mediation has become particularly popular, these dispute resolution pro-
cesses also are evolving—with variation in their use among the districts and 
blurring of the lines between judicial settlement sessions and mediation. And 
fourth, the gathering and analysis of data regarding the federal courts is in evo-
lution. While much is reported about magistrate judges’ functions, much more 
is unknown—e.g., how many dispositions actually result from magistrate judg-
es’ settlement sessions, how many cases go to mediation, how often magistrate 
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judges serve as mediators, how many dispositions result from mediation and 
other settlement procedures, and the terms of these dispositions. 
There is no denying the state of flux in which the federal courts and magis-
trate judges currently operate. Nonetheless, they possess a clear and steady 
mandate—to provide people with a forum in which they can trust that they will 
receive procedural and substantive justice. The procedural justice literature de-
scribed in this Article consistently counsels that the federal courts and magis-
trate judges should structure their settlement procedures to provide parties with 
the opportunity for voice, trustworthy consideration, and even-handed and re-
spectful treatment (of them and their claims) in a neutral forum.  
As this Article has demonstrated, the federal courts and magistrate judges 
are more likely to fulfill the demands of procedural justice, in both their settle-
ment and adjudicative procedures, if they undertake the following structural re-
forms: 
1) When different neutrals conduct the functions of settlement and adjudi-
cation (e.g., mediator and then magistrate judge, or magistrate judge and then 
district judge) and ex parte meetings are used during the settlement phase, the 
federal courts should provide for strict confidentiality regarding settlement 
communications and conduct, with limited and explicit exceptions. 
2) When a single magistrate judge conducts the functions of both settle-
ment and adjudication, the magistrate judge should be barred from using caucus 
or ex parte meetings during the settlement session, and the parties should be 
given the opportunity after the settlement session to elect whether or not the 
magistrate judge will conduct the trial (using the confidential, “blind consent” 
procedures provided by 28 USC § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
3) The Judicial Conference of the United States should provide its magis-
trate judges with the opportunity to receive feedback and engage in self-
reflection regarding parties’ and attorneys’ perceptions of the procedural justice 
of their settlement sessions. Various models exist to engage in such feedback 
and self-reflection, and these models could be adapted to fit the needs of the 
federal courts. The author and her colleagues also offer a questionnaire in the 
Appendix that focuses particularly on the procedural justice of settlement ses-
sions. 
In addition, due to the significant role played by settlement in the disposi-
tion of federal matters, the Judicial Conference should require the Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts to report data regarding the number of disposi-
tions that are the result of settlement generally and, more specifically, the 
number of such dispositions that are the result of: unassisted settlement by the 
parties, settlement sessions conducted by magistrate judges, settlement sessions 
conducted by district judges, mediations conducted by courts’ staff or roster 
mediators, and mediations conducted by private mediators. 
This is an ambitious reform agenda. It is also an agenda that the federal 
courts’ magistrate judges are particularly suited to lead.
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APPENDIX: MCADOO, STIENSTRA & WELSH, 317 ATTORNEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON JUDICIAL 
SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES318 







We would appreciate your taking a few minutes to fill out this questionnaire, which 
asks about the judicial settlement conference held in one of your cases on 
_____________. Please answer all questions with reference to the case specified above. 
Confidentiality 
Your responses to this questionnaire will be confidential and reported only after 
being aggregated with results from many other questionnaires. No response you make 
will be reported in a way that identifies you. Your identity will be known only to the 
researchers administering this survey and will be removed upon completion of the 
study.  
Response time and date 
Testing of the questionnaire suggests that it should take you no more than 10–15 
minutes to complete. Because we are asking only a sample of attorneys about the 
court’s settlement conference procedures, every response is important. We very much 
appreciate your response. We hope to hear from you by ___. 
Returning to an incomplete questionnaire319 
If you do not complete the questionnaire in one sitting, you may come back to fin-
ish it later. When you do, you will be returned to the place in the questionnaire where 
you had stopped. Please navigate through the questionnaire by using the “Back” and 
“Next” buttons at the bottom of the page, instead of your browser’s “Back” button. 
Contact information 
If you have any questions about the questionnaire or study, please contact: _____. 
If you have any questions about technical aspects of the questionnaire, please contact: 
_____. 
                                                        
317  Bobbi McAdoo is Professor Emerita and Senior Fellow, Dispute Resolution Institute, 
Mitchell Hamline School of Law and can be reached at bobbi.mcadoo@mitchellhamline.edu 
Donna Stienstra is Senior Researcher, Federal Judicial Center and can be reached at 202-
502-4081 and dstienst@fjc.gov. Nancy Welsh is the William Trickett Faculty Scholar and 
Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law and can be reached at 
717-241-3508 and nxw10@psu.edu. Ms. Stienstra’s work on the questionnaire was inde-
pendent of her work at the Center. The authors are listed alphabetically. They contributed 
equally to the development and writing of the questionnaire. 
318  It is presumed that this questionnaire will be completed online. 
319  Such an instruction is needed only for electronic questionnaires. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ATTORNEYS WHO PARTICIPATED IN A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
FACILITATED BY A JUDGE 
This questionnaire asks about your experience with a specific settlement 
conference conducted by a judge. The questionnaire does not ask about any in-
formal settlement discussions the lawyers may have had with the judge in the 
context of other conferences or hearings.  
Please recall the case referenced on the cover page and the settlement con-
ference held in that case on ___ and conducted by Judge ___. It is critical that 
you complete this questionnaire for this particular settlement conference only. 
The questionnaire begins with questions about actions the judge may have 
taken during the settlement conference and your assessment of those actions. 
The questionnaire concludes with some questions that ask for information 
about the case and yourself. 
I. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE JUDGE’S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE AND YOUR 
ASSESSMENT OF IT 
 
1.   In preparation for the settlement conference, did the judge, or someone on 
behalf of the judge, talk with and/or provide written guidance to the law-
yers about how the conference would be conducted? Please check one. 
___ Yes, the judge did 
___ Yes, someone on behalf of the judge did  
___ No  
___ Don’t recall 
 
2.   Was your client present at the settlement conference? Please check one. 
 ___ Yes, in person.  
___ Yes, by phone.  
___ No. 
___ Other. Please describe: ________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________ 
 
3.   At the beginning of the settlement conference, did the judge explain to the 
clients how the conference would be conducted? Please check one. 
___ Yes  
___ No  
___ Don’t recall 
___ Clients were not present at the beginning or did not attend the  
settlement conference 
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4.   At any point during the settlement conference, was your client excluded 
from discussions where the judge was present? Please check one. 
___ My client was present during all these discussions 
___ My client was included in some of these discussions and excluded 
from others 
___ My client was excluded from all of these discussions 
___ Don’t recall 




5.   In the settlement conference, the judge may have kept all the attending 
lawyers and clients together in a joint session, or the judge may have met 
separately with smaller groups of lawyers and/or clients in private caucus-
es, or the judge may have done both. What percentage of your time did you 
spend in joint sessions—i.e., with the judge and all attending lawyers and 
clients present either in person or participating by telephone? Please check 
one response. 
___ More than 75% of my time 
___ 50–74% of my time 
___ 25–49% of my time 
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6.    The questions below list techniques the judge may or may not have used in 
the settlement conference. We are interested in whether the judge used these 
techniques at all, and if so, was it during “joint sessions” (i.e., with all attending 
lawyers and clients present) or during “private caucus” (i.e., with some smaller 
group of clients and/or lawyers present). We are also interested in how helpful 
it was when the judge used a technique. If the judge used a technique, please 
check column 2, column 3, or both, as appropriate. 
 




The judge did 









Used in a 
private 
caucus 
a. Ask the parties to state their legal 
arguments? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
b. Ask the parties if there were non-
legal (e.g., personal, relational, finan-
cial) needs and concerns to discuss in 
order to reach resolution? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
c. Interrupt the parties in a rude way? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
d. Encourage your client to speak dur-
ing the settlement conference? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
e. Express displeasure with your cli-
ent? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
f. Express confidence in the ability of 
the parties to resolve their dispute? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
g. Recommend a specific settlement 
figure or package? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
h. Demonstrate that he or she had 
both parties’ most important interests 
in mind in trying to reach a settle-
ment? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
                                                        
320  When a respondent checks the box for columns 2 and 3, the following question and re-
sponse options will appear: 
How helpful or detrimental to reaching settlement was the judge’s use of this technique? 
Very helpful 
Somewhat helpful 
Neither helpful nor detrimental 
Somewhat detrimental 
Very detrimental 
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i. Summarize his or her understanding 
of your client’s legal arguments? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
j. Summarize his or her understanding 
of what was important to your client 
in resolving the case? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
k. Encourage the parties to develop 
their own settlement proposals? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
l. Assess the strengths and weakness-
es of your case? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
m. Summarize his or her understand-
ing of the other party’s legal argu-
ments? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
n. Summarize his or her understand-
ing of what was important to the other 
party in resolving the case? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
o. Predict the outcome of the case? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
p. Explain why he or she viewed the 
case as he or she did. [  ] [  ] [  ] 
q. Express displeasure at the progress 
of the settlement negotiations? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
r. Express disagreement with the posi-
tion taken by your client? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
s. Discuss the uncertainties of contin-
ued litigation for your case? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
t. Tell you that he or she might make 
a procedural or substantive decision 
during the litigation process that 
would be adverse to your client’s in-
terests? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] 
u. Pressure your client to accept a 
proposed settlement agreement? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
v. Pressure you to accept a proposed 
settlement agreement? [  ] [  ] [  ] 
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7.   The questions in this section ask for your overall assessment of the judge’s 
















The judge’s understanding of your 
client’s legal position was:  [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
The judge’s understanding of your 
client’s non-legal (e.g., personal, 
relational, financial) needs and 
concerns was:  
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 
 
8.   The questions in this section ask for your overall assessment of the judge’s 
treatment of the lawyers and clients during the settlement conference. 




















Did your client have suf-
ficient opportunity to ex-
press what was important 
to him or her in resolving 
the case?  
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 




















The manner in which the 
judge treated your client 
was: 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
The manner in which the 
judge treated you was: [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ]  
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Was the judge 
even-handed in 
his/her treatment 
of your client 
and the opposing 
client(s)? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 


















Was the judge 
even-handed in 
his/her treatment 
of you and the 
attorney(s) on the 
opposing side(s)? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
       
 Very high High Medium Low Very low  
As a result of the 
judge’s involve-
ment in the settle-
ment process, my 
level of trust in the 
judge is:  
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ]  
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To a very 
great extent  
Did you feel rushed 
by the judge to con-
clude the settlement 
conference? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ]  









Unfair Very unfair 
The process used by the 
judge to help the parties 
make progress toward 
settlement was: 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 
9.   The following questions give you an opportunity to provide your evalua-
tion of the settlement conference in your own words. 
 
a.   What happened in the settlement conference that was most 
helpful? Please specify whether it happened in joint session or 
caucus. 
b.   What happened in the settlement conference that was least 
helpful? Please specify whether it happened in joint session or 
caucus. 
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II.   QUESTIONS ABOUT THE STATUS OF YOUR CASE AT THE TIME OF THE SETTLEMENT 
CONFERENCE AND THE OUTCOME OF THE SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE 
 
 
10.   Which of the following were true at the time of the settlement conference? 
Please check all that apply. 
___ Additional discovery was needed to have productive settlement 
discussions. 
___ We had had other settlement discussions with this judge or another 
judge. 
___ We had participated in mediation or arbitration with a non-judge 
neutral.  
___ A motion to dismiss or for summary judgment was pending. 
___ A motion to dismiss or for summary judgment had been decided. 






11.   Who initially suggested or requested the settlement conference? Please 
check one. 
___ I did. 
___ Another party, or other parties in the proceeding, did.321 
___ The judge assigned to the case did. 
___ Settlement conferences are required by the rules or procedures of 
this court. 
___ Other. Please describe. __________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________ 
                                                        
321  If a respondent selects the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th option, a question will appear that asks wheth-
er participation was willing or not, using the following options: 
And I participated willingly 
And I participated unwillingly 
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12.   How important was each of the following as a reason for participating in 















I wanted to avoid leaving the outcome 
to a judge or jury. [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 I wanted a judge’s opinion of the legal 
issues before proceeding to trial. [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
I felt the judge expected us to have a 
settlement conference with him/her. [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
I wanted my client to hear the judge’s 
assessment of the case. [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Other. Please describe.____________ [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 
 




14.   If this case goes/has gone to trial (please check one response for each ques-
tion): 
 Would this judge preside?   ___ Yes     ___ No 
 Would the trial be:      ___ A jury trial     ___ A bench trial 
 
 
15.   For the purpose of settlement, the timing of the settlement conference was 
(please check one):  
___ Too early  
___ At the right time  
___ Too late 
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16.   How long did the settlement conference last? Please check one response 
for each question. 
 
___  
< 1 hour 
___  
1 to 2 
hours 
___  
2.1 to 5 
hours 
___  
5.1 to 8 
hours 
___  
8.1 to 12 
hours 
___ 
> 12 hours 
 




No, too little 
time 
___  





17.   Did this case have any of the following outcomes as a direct result of the 
settlement conference? Please check one. 
___ The entire case settled as a result of the settlement conference (ei-
ther during the conference or later). 
___ A part of the case settled as a result of the settlement conference 
(either during the conference or later). 
___ No part of the case settled, but the settlement conference im-
proved the chances that the case would settle. 
___ The settlement conference contributed little, if anything, to reso-
lution of this case. 




[Respondents will be routed to questions 18–20 only if the case settled.] 




Unfair Very unfair 
18.   In your view, how fair 
to your client was the 
settlement agreement? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
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19.   Could all the terms of the settlement agreement have been awarded by a 
judge or jury? Please check one. 
___ Yes, all the terms of the settlement agreement could have been 
awarded by a judge or jury. 
___ No, some or all the terms of the settlement agreement could not 
have been awarded by a judge or jury. 
 




Yes, to a 
significant 
extent 
Yes, to a 
very great 
extent 
20.  Did your client ac-
cept the settlement 
agreement because 
of pressure from 
the judge? 
[  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 
 
III.  QUESTIONS ABOUT THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE AND THE NATURE OF YOUR 
PRACTICE  
 
21.   Which of the following characteristics describe this case? Please check all 
that apply. 
___ There was a high level of anger/hostility between the clients. 
___ There was a large power imbalance between the parties. 
___ The opposing party’s lawyer was not cooperative. 
___ The clients were interested in continuing, restoring or establishing 
a relationship with each other. 
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22.   What type of case is this? Please check all that apply. 
___ Personal Injury ___ Medical Malpractice ___ Product Liability 
___ General Tort ___ Contract ___ Intellectual Property 
___ Real Property ___ Employment ___ Other Civil Rights 
___ Other. Please specify. ______________________________________________ 
 
 
23.   In what kind of setting do you practice? Please check one. 
___ Law firm of 1–10 lawyers 
___ Law firm of 11–75 lawyers 
___ Law firm of more than 75 lawyers 
___ Government 
___ Not-for-profit or non-profit entity 




24.   What is your gender? Please check one.     ___ Female     ___ Male 
 
 
25.   In this case, what type of client are you representing? Please check all that 
apply. 
___ Private, individual client 
___ Private, business client  
___ Government 
___ Not-for-profit or non-profit entity 
___ Other. Please describe. __________________________________ 
________________________________________________________ 
 
26.   In the last two years, in how many civil cases has your client been a party? 
Please check one. 
___ Only this case 
___ 1–2 cases  
___ 3–5 cases 
___ More than 5 cases 
___ I don’t know 
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27.   Considering this case and all cases in which you have been involved during 
the past two years, either representing a party or acting as a neutral and in 
this court or others, approximately how many times have you:  
Please check one response for each question. 0–2 3–10 11–20 >20 
Participated in a settlement conference with a 
judge? [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Participated in a settlement conference with 
this judge? [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Participated in a mediation conducted by a 
mediator?  [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Tried a case to verdict or decision? [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Served as a mediator? [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
Served as an arbitrator? [  ] [  ] [  ] [  ] 
 THANK YOU. 
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